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Abstract
This study examined six people-integration best practices during mergers and
acquisitions (M&As): cultural due diligence, cultural integration, integration planning,
integration managers and teams, communication practices, and leadership support.
Interviews were conducted with 12 individuals who played key roles in M&As. The
study findings supported the use of all the best practices with the exception of cultural
due diligence and integration managers. Recommendations of this study are to perform
cultural exploration, implement the best practices validated by the study, and hold leaders
accountable for supporting the M&A effort. Recommendations for research include
examining the impact of external factors on M&A success and improving measures of the
people impact on M&A success. This study concludes that organization development
practitioners must lead the charge in executing M&As with consideration of the human
impact. Practitioners can be aided in this effort by familiarizing themselves with the
M&A best practices validated in this study.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are an essential corporate strategy for growth.
M&As are undertaken for many reasons: to enter a new market, grow the company’s
current market share, extend a product line, add a technology or gain a first-mover
advantage, for example (Eisenmann, 2006). Unfortunately, many M&As do not achieve
the intended financial end-state when measured in ways including share value, return on
investment, and post-combination profitability. More than half of M&As are unsuccessful
(Marks & Mirvis, 1985; Papadakis, 2007). It appears that the manner in which M&As are
executed is often at the core of this failure rate (Marks & Mirvis, 2001).
In effect, M&As uproot and force change in both organizations, both
operationally and culturally. Combining cultures is not a venture to take lightly: culture
embodies the way we do things around here (Kotter, 2007; Marks, 1999); therefore, it is
one of the strongest forces governing how an organization runs. Members of
organizations have learned a pattern of shared, socially maintained basic assumptions that
help individuals interpret their organizational experiences and learn what best fits in that
environment (Schein, 1985). Changing underlying patterns of behavior and assumptions
is a large undertaking, and if that change is derailed anywhere along the line, the M&A is
poised to fail. Literature on M&As (e.g., Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 1988), suggests that
the more congruent a target organization’s culture is with the acquiring organization’s
culture, the more likely it is that the M&A will succeed. When considered from a change
management perspective, this is logical: M&A related change needs to simultaneously
address the internal organizational dynamics created by a large change and the interorganizational dynamics associated with blending two distinctive organizational identities
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into one (Seo & Hill, 2005), and congruence between those cultures means that this
change will be less dramatic.
Despite the popularity of M&As as a growth strategy for business, the conditions
under which M&As enhance a firm’s value are still unclear (Stahl & Voight, 2008).
Numerous factors play a role in any company’s performance. Combining two
organizations only increases the complexity of the organization, making the task of
maximizing value even more difficult. Regardless, the integration of people is common to
most M&A, and in conducting this integration, there are some predictable issues that can
be anticipated long before a deal closes (Ashkenas, DeMonaco, & Francis, 1998).
Overall, the results of M&A are affected by the integration of people and the
resulting human resource problems. In many cases, M&A synergies exist before the deal;
however, the outcomes of M&As depend upon the steps taken after the deal is done
(Haspslagh & Jemison, 1991). The processes used to combine companies are integral to
an M&A’s eventual success or failure (Marks & Mirvis, 2011) and the achievement of fit
between the two firms is essential to M&A success. Many firms do not realize all the
possible synergistic benefits from an M&A because top managers either failed to
consider or were unable to manage the organizational and human resource issues that
arose (Schweiger & Weber, 1989).
The literature outlines some standard practices that help with M&A integration,
which can be considered as best practices for integration. Given the high costs of M&As
and their high failure rate, it is essential that acquiring companies understand, plan for,
and manage the processes that contribute to M&A success.
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Background
Many organizations focus on finance and strategy in the pre-acquisition phase,
and do not spend much time considering culture or conducting a cultural due diligence.
Cultural due diligence can help organizations to assess both their own and the target
firm’s culture, and ascertain whether the two companies will be relatively easier or
difficult to integrate at a human level. This part of the due diligence process assesses
differences in people-related matters, such as corporate values, organization structure,
decision- making processes, and reward systems (Marks, 1999), and can include
integrating cultural criteria in the earliest of merger discussions; staffing and preparing
due diligence teams with an eye toward cultural criteria; adding cultural criteria to due
diligence data collection, and using formal tools to assess culture fit. There is no perfect
or scientific way of assessing culture, and understanding another firm’s culture grows
even more difficult in M&As, due in large part to the necessity of maintaining
confidentiality and the secrecy shrouding M&A discussions. Nor should a potential
culture clash prevent an M&A entirely, as other factors may still make this a good deal.
However, an upfront consideration of corporate culture may help to align leaders’
thinking about the M&A, highlight potential areas for culture clashes, and prepare line
managers and operational managers on both sides for managing the differences and the
change. Cultural due diligence and pre-merger discussion can help to articulate a clear
vision and strategy (Papadakis, 2007), help both the acquirers and the acquired company
to consider the desired end-state ahead of the formal M&A (Marks 1999), and determine
if the managers on both sides are ready and willing to accept and promote this end.
Relatedly, a frequently cited reason for M&A failure is the exodus of key
personnel who are turned off by the new culture or direction of the company (e.g. Marks,
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1999). M&As are events that significantly affect employees’ lives. Employees may have
a hard time focusing on the requirements of their job as their anxiety and stress levels are
increased, leaving the organization to flounder while people are preoccupied with
determining what this change means for their careers. Role ambiguity and role conflict
may become salient and stressful for employees, as many aspects of their jobs are
changed, such as their tasks, bosses, responsibilities, co-workers, and expectations
(Mirvis & Marks, 1992). These changes can negatively affect employees’ morale,
effectiveness, and commitment (Seo & Hill, 2005) and may result in increased
absenteeism, defeatism, reluctance to change, or insubordination. Marks and Mirvis
(1985) characterized these types of behaviors as Merger Syndrome. Since M&As are
undertaken in order to improve growth and enhance profitability of the acquirer, such
behaviors are clearly undesirable.
Integrating companies is difficult, and sufficient attention needs to be paid to
people matters throughout the M&A process to ensure that integration is successful.
Marks and Mirvis (2011) outlined a planning framework, based upon Kurt Lewin’s
(1951) cultural change model of unfreezing, moving and refreezing. The framework
utilizes four steps: first, define the desired cultural end state; next, deepen cross-cultural
learning; then drive the combination toward the desired end; and finally, reinforce the
emerging culture through substance and symbolism. Each of these steps is reinforced by
the best practices review of integrating companies.
Although there has been a great deal of research done into mergers and M&As
over the last 40 years, the continued high failure rate of M&As suggests that there is still
a lack of understanding by businesses of how to apply the research knowledge.
Additionally, the converse is also true: the actual processes used by acquirers to integrate
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their acquired companies are not well understood in the literature (Haleblian, Devers,
McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison, 2009). As Haleblian et al. note, “There is much to
learn about the implementation of acquisitions, especially about how firms integrate,
transfer, and manage the resources of the combines firm, which underscores the need for
greater focus on acquisition implementation in general” (p. 490). Based upon the
research, this study will attempt to identify some general best practices from research
knowledge and understand how these are being applied in M&As, and to what effect.
Research Purpose
Despite the body of research and theory surrounding them, M&As regularly fail.
In part, this may be because theoretical research can be difficult to translate into actions
and business practices for companies that are overwhelmed with numerous priorities and
targets, and for executives and managers for whom integration is just one more thing on a
busy to-do list. The purpose of this study was to identify and examine the use of peopleintegration best practices during M&As within the private sector.
Significance of Study
This study will add practical significance to the body of knowledge on M&As and
cultural due diligence efforts. While there is much research around M&As, the failure
rate is still very high given the importance of M&As as a business strategy. This study
will look at the current research on integrating M&As, highlight some best practices for
businesses, and look at which of these are currently being applied in a business setting,
and to what effect.
Organization of the Study
This chapter reviewed the background, purpose, and significance of the study.
Chapter 2 provides a further review of relevant literature. Chapter 3 details the methods
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used in this study, including the research design, sampling, interview procedures, and
data analysis procedures. Chapter 4 presents the study results. Chapter 5 provides a
discussion of the results, including conclusions, practical recommendations, implications
for organization development practitioners, limitations of the study, and suggestions for
additional research.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
The chapter presents a review of literature relevant to the present study. An
overview of M&A efforts is provided first, followed by a discussion of the integration
process. General success factors advocated for M&A efforts are addressed next. This
chapter closes with a summary of M&A best practices.
Mergers and Acquisitions
M&As are large-scale cultural change initiatives undertaken for various reasons,
including financial gain, organizational growth, competitive advantage, and acquisition of
organizational products or capabilities. Synergies in M&A come from both the
similarities and the differences between the combining organizations. Larsson and
Finklestein (1999) conceptualize the combination potential of M&A in terms of the
strategic similarity (creating “economies of sameness”) and the strategic
complementarities (creating “economies of fitness”) of the joining firms. However, the
fact that two firms have a high combination potential does not automatically mean that
the M&A will have high value creation; rather, the extent of synergy realization depends
upon how the new organization is managed after the deal is closed (Datta, 1991;
Schweiger, Ivancevich, & Power, 1987).
Given the difficulty and importance of integration in achieving results from
M&A, one might reach the conclusion that it is better to simply leave both firms as
standalone entities. M&A researchers refute this idea: the general best practice for firms
that are involved in M&A is to integrate the two companies when people are important to
the success of the M&A, regardless of the two firms’ cultural distance, because the
difference in culture will remain if the company remains a standalone entity. This leaves
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the source of friction between the two firms intact, and enables the continuation of
culture clash (Larsson & Finklestein, 1999).
In order for synergies to be realized, M&As require that organizational changes
are made in one or both firms. How these planned changes are implemented is integral to
whether the deal is successful (Marks & Mirvis, 2011). Larsson and Finklestein’s (1999)
literature review of cases on M&As, and found that the integration of organizations is the
strongest predictor of M&A success. This same study found that compared to those that
focused on integration, organizations with high synergy potential that did not attend to
integration efforts had much poorer overall results in M&As.
The Integration Process
Organizational integration can be considered conceptually as both the degree of
interaction between the combining companies and the extent of efforts to improve the
quality of that interaction. Increasing both the quantity and quality of integration efforts
has a positive effect on overall synergy realization. Having few, or uncoordinated,
interactions are unlikely to achieve any substantial benefits for the companies (Larsson &
Finklestein, 1999).
Cultural due diligence. Prior to the deal, conducting a thorough cultural due
diligence of the target company, studying the culture of an organization and the roles,
capabilities and attitudes of its people (Papadakis, 2007), can help the acquiring company
to determine the value of the M&A and plan for post-acquisition integration processes.
Building on Schein’s (1985) work on organizational culture, the purpose of conducting a
cultural due diligence is to allow the two companies to combine insider knowledge with
outside questions, raising both companies assumptions to the surface and allowing the
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companies to examine their belief systems and structures; allowing for a deeper
understanding from both companies perspectives.
Due diligence is traditionally focused on financial and strategic market factors in
an M&A, and cultural due diligence is often non-existent or done in a cursory manner
(Harding & Rouse, 2007). The reasons for failing to conduct a culture due diligence are
numerous. For example, M&As are often shrouded in secrecy and legally bound to
confidentiality prior to the deal’s close and public announcement; issues relating to
management style are sensitive and can be controversial; and cultural factors are not
easily quantifiable, but quantitative financial data is easier to defend if there is a legal
challenge to the deal (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1987). However, M&A researchers (e.g.
Datta, 1991; Weber, 1996) have shown that cultural fit factors can derail an acquisition if
not managed carefully. Financial and strategic fit will not offset a cultural mismatch: the
high failure rate for M&A is in large part due to the exodus of key personnel (Marks,
1999). Individuals who leave have their own reasons to do so, and many M&A include
substantial monetary payouts to some individuals; however, many ‘survivors’ of the first
few months may choose to leave later due to cultural fit issues. When due diligence does
not take into account the cultural fit aspect of an M&A, the acquiring firm may fail to
uncover some irreconcilable differences between firms, often due to culture clash and the
Merger Syndrome. Cultural due diligence can also enable the acquirer to assess the
leadership and management teams at the target company and consider management style
compatibility. Conducting a cultural due diligence can help the acquirer to understand the
target company’s culture, verify that the target’s culture is compatible enough with the
acquirer’s to allow for integration to proceed, and plan its approach to integration
(Harding & Rouse, 2007).
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When cultural differences are uncovered during diligence, the question of whether
the deal should go ahead may arise. On this point, the literature around cultural distance
is fragmented, with some authors suggesting that cultural distance between firms is the
cause of issues (e.g. Datta, 1991) and others suggesting that cultural distance can be
positive as both sides can learn from one another (e.g. Larsson & Finkelstein, 1999).
Reviews, such as that by Teerikangas and Very (2006), have concluded that the findings
of studies on cultural distance as it relates to M&A performance are inconsistent. A metaanalysis of existing research by Stahl and Voight (2008) concluded that cultural
differences between organizations can be both an asset and a liability to post-M&A
performance, depending on a number of contingencies, two of which are the degree of
relatedness and cultural differences within the firms. As Marks and Mirvis (2011) show,
successful combinations do not require the combining entities to be ‘cultural clones’, but
rather that the two companies are similar enough to take advantage of their differences.
Thus, the potential impact of cultural differences between the acquired and acquiring
companies is something that potential acquirers must be aware of and consider during the
due diligence process. As Weber (1996) states, “the implication for practitioners is clear:
the management of the buying firm should pay at least as much attention to cultural fit
factors during the pre-merger search process and post-merger integration process as they
do to finance and strategic factors” (p. 1199).
The makeup of the due diligence team is just as important as completing a due
diligence process. The effectiveness of the cultural due diligence is heightened by
broadening the group to include not only finance and legal advisors, but also staff
professionals from areas such as Information Technology, Human Resources and
operational and line managers. At least some managers who will be working closely with
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the newly acquired company should be a part of assessing its fit; these are the individuals
who can see beyond the tunnel vision of numbers and strategy and find reasons why a
deal that may look good on paper would be difficult to integrate (Marks, 1999).
Operating managers can also take this opportunity to assess the chemistry between
themselves and their counterparts, and assess the bench strength of the target company’s
management team. The due diligence team should include at least some members of the
integration team, as they will have the best insight into what will be needed to integrate it
after the deal is closed.
Integration planning. Planning for the post-acquisition integration should
happen as soon as possible, ideally before the deal has actually closed. The early stages
of an M&A provide a chance for the top management team to decide on performance
targets and metrics, resources, organizational structures, staff allocation and benchmarks
for performance, creating a roadmap of what needs to be accomplished (Papadakis,
2007). While it may seem obvious that integrations should be planned, managers on both
sides of the deal have numerous other priorities and stresses, and planning can get
forgotten in the melee. In Papadakis’ (2005) study, about 60% of companies had no
specific communication plan before the merger, and 38% still had no plan even after the
merger. The risk is that without a vision and a plan, a transformation effort can “easily
dissolve into a list of confusing and incompatible projects that can take the organization
in the wrong direction or nowhere at all” (Kotter, 2007, p. 99). Moreover, the knowledge
of the organization gained through the planning process can enable leaders to provide a
clear statement of rationale for the merger that goes beyond the numbers, and can be used
to explain to employees what the vision is and how the M&A will affect them (Marks &
Mirvis, 2001).
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Much of the work on managing cultural change during M&As draws upon
Schein’s (1985) classic view of culture and its embedding mechanisms, studying how
leaders within the organization can affect and implement organizational culture change.
According to Marks and Mirvis’ (2001) planning framework for cultural change, the first
step is to define a desired end state for the M&A. This end state should create a plan for
what the company will look like in a year’s time financially, strategically,
organizationally and operationally (Ashkenas, Francis, & Heinick, 2011). It should define
who has responsibility and accountability for projects and actions (Schweiger et al.,
1987), include expectations for managers on both sides, provide some behavioral anchors
for employees, lay out the structure, processes, systems and procedures to be used, and
provide goals and objectives for the organization (Marks & Mirvis, 2011). Defining the
end-state has a dual purpose: it creates a vision and target for the organization, and
provides natural benchmarks or achievements. Celebrating these milestones is important
(Kotter, 2007), as they are marks of interim successes that employees can rally around,
building momentum en route to achieving that end state.
In determining the end state, including managers from both the acquiring and the
acquired organization allows begins to bridge the cultural gap, and enables key leaders to
engage with their counterparts in the other organization and learn about their new
colleagues (Ashkenas et al., 1998). In creating the vision, the focus should remain
positive—what are the strengths of each organization and how can they be leveraged to
achieve success? Additionally, where are the opportunities for improvement and what can
be changed, developed or grown? Having members of both organizations there also helps
to create a fair and balanced assessment process for selecting talent from the overall
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employee pool, and engages the managers of the new organization in building their new
teams and leading the change efforts (Ashkenas et al., 2011).
Once the integration activities are planned, a timetable can be set. There are two
considerations around the timetable for integration: that changes should be made as
quickly as possible to minimize employee insecurity and uncertainty; and that a longer
timeframe allows both companies to learn about one another to leverage the strengths of
each (Schweiger, Csiszar, & Napier, 1993). While it is important that decisions are made
quickly, management needs to ensure that it is taking its time to restructure with
sensitivity and consideration for employees, or they risk beginning their tenure without
the trust and respect of the employees that remain (Ashkenas et al., 1998). Researchers
and M&A practitioners suggest a timetable of 100 days is appropriate in balancing these
considerations (Ashkenas et al., 1998; Papadakis, 2007). The value of the hundred-day
timetable is that it allows for consideration of longer-term effects of actions while being
relatively short. Thus, it creates a ‘sense of urgency, challenge and excitement; it imbues
the organization with a feeling of zest and energy’ (Ashkenas et al., 1998), and shortens
the period of anxiety and uncertainty for employees as answers and stability are
forthcoming quickly.
When planning, it is important to ensure that any decisions regarding people, such
as the organization structure, roles, and reporting relationships, should be made public
and implemented as soon as possible (Ashkenas et al., 1998). Employees in the acquired
firm are likely feeling ‘Merger Syndrome’, a combination of anxiety, loss of identity,
confusion about their roles, uncertainty about their jobs, and perhaps even anger at the
organization (Marks & Mirvis, 1985). Clarity and communication from managers can
help to lessen the depth of Merger Syndrome and enable employees to begin to
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acculturate. Key employees that are targeted for retention should be aware of this as soon
as possible; preferably in due diligence or shortly after the close of the deal (Harding &
Rouse, 2007). Conversely, if there are terminations or layoffs as a part of a restructuring,
it is important that these are announced and completed as soon as possible, and that it is
clear what the criteria for termination is (Schwieger et al., 1987).
Role of the integration manager. Although identifying what needs to be done
can be relatively straightforward, putting it into practice is not. The person identified to
manage all aspects of the integration is known as the integration manager. This
individual’s role is to oversee the dozens of processes and changes that need to take
effect, help the new company add functions that may not have existed before and
coordinate with corporate support functions such as HR and IT, lead the team
development and employee selection processes to ensure that they are fair and consistent,
communicate with management at both companies, manage the communication strategy
with the newly acquired employees, identify and develop action plans to address cultural
integration of the companies, and educate the new management team around the
acquirer’s business cycle, reviews, performance metrics, strategic planning, budgeting
and other central processes, amongst other tasks (Ashkenas et al., 1998; Ashkenas &
Francis, 2000; Shelton, Fontila, Huyett, & Sias, 2003). The integration manager differs
from the general leadership team of the company in that the M&A is their sole focus.
This individual does not have competing priorities outside of the M&A and should spend
more time then the remainder of the leadership team ensuring that the deal generates the
expected results.
The integration manager’s main task is to ensure that all aspects of the plan are
being executed on. However, the task of an integration manager goes beyond being just a
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project coordinator; the integration manager is essential to ensuring that the synergies of
the deal and potential value creation is realized. The integration manager should be
involved from the pre-acquisition phase, as a part of the due diligence team (Marks &
Mirvis, 2000). At this stage, the integration manager can be establishing trust with the
target’s management, building a positive image of the acquiring firm with the target
firm’s employees (Ivancevich, Schweiger & Power, 1987), and portraying a positive
image of the M&A to the public (Teerikangas, Very & Pisano, 2011). At the same time,
the integration manager is learning the goals of the merger, the expected outcomes, and
any unwritten informal understandings that may be decided between the two companies’
negotiators (Shelton et al., 2003). Early inclusion also ensures that the integration
manager can hit the ground running once the deal is announced, beginning the integration
process immediately.
The integration manager is uniquely positioned to understand both sides of the
M&A; they have the benefit of knowledge of the acquirer, and have worked with the
target firm’s management prior to the M&A announcement. This knowledge enables
them to translate things between the two companies, helping each side to navigate the
politics, structures and personalities of the other (Ashkenas & Francis, 2000; Ashkenas et
al., 1998) Once the deal is closed, the integration manager can begin the work of building
teams, determining which processes, systems and structures work best in the new
company, and communicating the expected next steps to employees. The integration
manager also acts as a sounding board, providing support and advice to people working
on both sides of the deal, and helping the employees of the newly acquired firm
understand the acquirer’s culture (Ashkenas et al., 1998). Thus, the ideal integration
manager has a mix of technical expertise, business understanding, managerial capability,
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and strong interpersonal skills. They need a deep knowledge of how the acquirer works
(Ashkenas & Francis, 2000), and must also understand and believe in the possibilities
created by the M&A (Marks & Mirvis, 2000; Seo & Hill, 2005). Finally, they should be a
recognized top talent from the acquiring organization, that the chief executive officer and
leadership team knows, trusts, and supports (Shelton et al., 2003), as they will function as
the leadership’s senses at the acquired company, reporting back and making
recommendations based upon what they see. It is therefore essential that they have the
support of the chief executive officer.
Having a capable integration manager is outlined in the literature as an integral
part of managing an M&A, and integration managers can lead and integration in
capturing the value of the M&A (Teerikangas et al., 2011).
Role of the transition team. One of the first tasks of the integration manager is to
create a transition team to assist in the integration of the two companies. The task force
should have a clear charter of responsibility from the senior leadership team, that makes
clear the types of deliverables expected of the team, and the timelines in which those
deliverables are expected. To enable the achievement of deliverables, this team should
consist of members of both companies’ leadership teams, from a variety of different
backgrounds and areas of expertise. The transition team takes
the ‘raw material’ of vision, high level strategy, and the hypothesized synergies
identified before the deal; study the realities of the combining units and functions
in light of competencies, technology, competition and customers’ needs; and craft
proposed actions to yield value. (Marks & Mirvis, 2000, p. 39)
They collect, validate and conduct analysis of options to move forward, creating
recommendations (Marks & Mirvis, 2000). These recommendations should be given
serious consideration by the leadership team, and if something needs to be revised should
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be given feedback as to why. If the transition team is not given any real power or value,
this will adversely affect the combination (Marks & Mirvis, 2011). As Marks and Mirvis
(2000) state,
when an executive team doesn’t have the bench strength to free up key people for
assignment to a one-year transition team (managers or executives), this can be an
early warning sign that the transition will not receive the resources it needs to
succeed. (p. 38)
A further identified advantage of transition teams is that the members of both
organizations are working together, creating an atmosphere of collaboration, teamwork
and understanding. This has the obvious advantage of creating gains in knowledge and
better teamwork amongst members of the transition team. Additionally, members of the
transition team will connect with others in their functional area to ask for input, advice
and feedback on ideas. Because the members of the team come from different functions
within the organization, this has the effect of directly involving numerous other people
within the organization, getting them committed to the ideas and communicating what is
being planned (Marks & Mirvis, 2000).
The transition team can only be effective if it is staffed with members that have a
cross-functional skill set, including managerial proficiency, interpersonal skills and
functional technical expertise; they should be flexible and consensus oriented, and they
need to be comfortable making decisions with little information and in recommending
courses of action for the organization (Marks & Mirvis, 2000). The transition team has a
combination of people devoted fulltime to the integration and line managers with specific
functional areas to address, such as IT or Supply Chain. Many of these members will
simultaneously have other roles that they are fulfilling, and the team will disband as the
integration proceeds and the changes become embedded in the organization. Thus, the
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integration manager should have input to appraising these individuals’ annual
performance, whether they are fulltime or part-time members of the team, to ensure that
the transition work is given high priority and the team is incentivized appropriately
(Shelton et al., 2003).
Role of the top management team. Top management teams are central to the
successful integration of M&As. They need to be involved in the entire process, from the
cultural due diligence process (Marks, 1999; Papadakis, 2007), to fostering trust amongst
employees (Sackmann, Eggenhofer-Rehart, & Friesl, 2009), developing culture (Kotter,
2007) and enabling communication between and within the new and old organizations.
Throughout the integration, the dedication, commitment and visibility of the management
team is critical to rapid and effective integration (Morgan & Zeffane, 2003), and they
must focus on ensuring that they are visible symbols of the organization, enacting its
culture (Papadakis, 2007). As Schein (1985, 1990) has shown, leaders are the primary
embedding mechanisms for culture, and what they attend to, measure and control, how
they react to critical events, and their deliberate modeling and coaching behaviors all
affect how employees perceive the organizational culture. Thus, it is concerning that a
‘significant proportion of M&As face a leadership vacuum’ (Papadakis, 2007).
General Success Factors
This is not an easy task; if planning and implementing M&A were simple and
straightforward, we would see many more of them achieving their strategic and financial
goals (Marks & Mirvis, 2000). The change process requires multiple decisions about the
depth, location and nature of changes, the speed with which changes are implemented,
and leadership capability in conducting the changes (Schweiger et al., 1993). Lack of
execution may be a major culprit in M&A failures. Plans for implementation can be
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perfect but if they are not acted upon, even a well-planned integration is likely to fail
(Marks & Mirvis, 2011).
Communication. Successful integration and value realization requires that there
is a constant flow of information about how employees are feeling and reacting and the
performance of the business. This information helps the leadership of the company to
monitor the impact of programs and strategies put in place, and directs attention and
resources to the programs that have the greatest impact on eventual success (Marks &
Mirvis, 2011).
Regardless of the approach taken to integration, one of the most regularly cited
best practices in making an M&A successful is to communicate with employees (e.g.,
Kay & Shelton, 2000; Larsson & Finklestein, 1999; Schweiger et al., 1987; Seo & Hill,
2005). The assumption is that the more employees know about what is happening, the
more they will be able to understand the rationale and accept the changes being imposed.
Unfortunately, one of the hallmarks of M&A is that communication is constricted in the
pre-deal phase, and companies are limited in what they are able to report until the deal is
complete. Without real information, rumors often abound, and as soon as an M&A is
announced, employees become anxious and uncertain about their jobs: ‘Merger
Syndrome’ begins to take effect.
Fortunately, there are a few ways to help reduce the effect of rumors and
uncertainty without sharing restricted information. Firstly, communicate as much and as
soon as possible, even if the content is just that nothing has yet been decided (Schweiger
& DeNisi, 1991; Schweiger & Weber, 1989). In planning the M&A and integration, one
of the major focuses of the integration manager and members of the leadership team
should be to create a communication plan for once the deal is complete. In particular,
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employees need to clearly understand any changes to their work environment and the
reasons for those changes (Seo & Hill, 2005). The more people know about what is
happening, and the more they believe that they are being told the truth, the greater their
levels of trust in the organization (Nikandrou, Papalexandris, & Bourantas, 2000). Once
something has been communicated, it must be followed up on; any failure to act upon
information that has been disseminated will corrode that same trust and negatively impact
the integration. Communication can take the form of both words and actions, and the
latter tend to be more powerful (Kotter, 2007). Thus, managers and those ‘in the know’
should be very aware that their actions are observed and imitated by employees, and any
gap between management’s words and deed will be heightened in employee’s minds and
drive distrust.
In a quasi-experimental study, Schweiger and DiNisi (1991) found that providing
a realistic ‘Merger Preview’, providing detailed information regarding the integration
timeline, how it is expected to proceed, the expected effect to employees, and any other
pertinent information helped to lessen the negative effects of the Merger Syndrome. The
preview enabled employees to understand what to expect from the M&A and what types
of things would change as a result of the transition, and provided them with a chance to
raise their concerns and ask questions of the management team. Knowing what was
coming helped employees plan their own contributions and see how they fit in to the
broader purpose, and quelled the rumor mill.
Schweiger and Goulet (2005) showed that the amount and type of communication
matters. They studied three levels of cultural learning in an M&A: no learning, shallow
learning, and deep learning. They found that having no cultural learning interventions has
no measurable effect on integration success or failure. Deep level cultural learnings
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included culture workshops, cross-company dialogue, and other interventions designed to
enable the two parties to understand and resolve their differences. Deep level
interventions had a strong positive effect on integration success, facilitating greater
cultural understanding, more communication across companies and faster resolution of
cultural differences. By contrast, shallow level cultural interventions, such as one-way
communications regarding company culture, official memos and notices actually had a
negative effect on integration success, as they reinforced the stereotypes that each
company had regarding the other. Thus, there is some evidence that in order for
communication surrounding M&As to be effective, it must provide employees with a
deeper level of understanding, interaction and dialogue, not merely create surface level
one-way information flow.
Additionally, communication between management and employees is essential to
any change management initiative (Kotter, 2007; Morgan & Zeffane, 2003; Sackmann et
al., 2009), and affects the level of trust employees have for the organization, which in
turn affects commitment to the organization (Morgan & Zeffane, 2003). Regular, open,
honest, and clear communication, increased visibility of senior management, a defined
strategy and involving middle managers have all been identified as methods to increase
the effectiveness of M&As (Kotter, 2007; Papadakis, 2007).
Executive support. Management and leadership behaviors are a major factor in
the success of M&As. Management’s interactions with employees pre- and postacquisition can affect employee commitment to the new organization. Employees are
more likely to trust managers who communicate openly and honestly and are perceived to
treat their employees fairly. In turn, this increases the employees’ trust in the organization
(Schweiger et al., 1987), and leads to greater levels of commitment. Committed
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employees are more likely to stay with the company, engage with their new roles, and
support the change, thereby helping the success of the organization. One of the derailers
of commitment is a lack of role clarity and expectations of employees following an
M&A. Strong managerial leadership can help develop and clarify employees’ roles in the
new organization (Mirvis & Marks, 1992), and both senior level and middle managers
have important roles to play in shaping the new organization.
Managers can support or derail the success of an M&A. The literature shows that
throughout the process, acquiring team members may “fall in love” with an M&A, and in
the process become blind to the risks of the deal and want to continue regardless of the
costs (Papadakis, 2007). This is problematic, and is partially why it is so important
broaden the team to include line managers in the due diligence process and as early as
possible in the post-acquisition process. The acquiring company’s line managers can then
use this early interaction to draw attention to any issues specific to their area of expertise
or inherent in their interactions with the acquiree’s management: managers who do not
have good interpersonal chemistry with the team they are assessing in the diligence
process are unlikely to develop this chemistry in the future (Seo & Hill, 2005). Including
line managers in decision-making early in the deal enables them to engage with the
acquisition process and increases their sense of accountability for the success of the deal.
Another role of these managers is to create a specific an action-oriented plan, and they
can use the due diligence, pre- and immediate post-acquisition phases to decide on
specific performance targets, organizational changes, product portfolios and benchmarks
to track performance.
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Summary of Best Practices
The literature reviewed in this chapter outline six primary best practices for M&A
integration. These provide a generalized process for integrating M&As and highlight the
value of considering human factors in M&As. While many of them represent
straightforward and commonsense approaches to large scale change management, the
failure rate of M&As shows how difficult they can be to correctly implement. In general,
when integrating M&As, the literature shows that the best practices include
1. Cultural due diligence: conduct a thorough cultural due diligence in addition to
the financial and strategic due diligence that is standard.
2. Integration planning: ensure that there is a detailed and action-oriented plan and
timeline for integration of the two companies.
3. Use of an integration manager: designate a trusted top performer from the
acquiring company as the integration manager, whose main focus is to ensure that
all aspects of the integration are taking top priority and being completed.
4. Use of an integration team: designate a cross-functional transition team who are
accountable for ensuring that the M&A is integrated within the designated
timeframe.
5. Effective communication: focus on communicating openly and honestly,
including clarifying any role ambiguity and providing a realistic preview of what
the M&A will involve for them.
6. Leadership support: Ensure that the management team is visible, involved and
accessible throughout the process and are modeling the behaviors and culture of
the integrated company.
Examining the use of these best practices in private sector M&A efforts was the
focus of this study. The next chapter outlines the methods used in this study.
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Chapter 3
Methods
The purpose of this study was to identify people-integration best practices during
M&As and examine their use in the private sector. The review of literature generated a
list of six integration best practices. Data were collected from managers in successful
M&As to understand their use of these best practices.
This chapter describes the methods used in this study. The following sections
outline the research design, research sample, measurement, data collection and analysis
procedures, and steps taken for the protection of human subjects.
Research Design
A qualitative research interview design was selected as appropriate for this study.
Use of this design allows for a depth of insights to be gained about the study topic
(Punch, 2005). Qualitative studies use relatively small sample sizes to allow for a depth
of information to be gathered. Kvale (1996) asserted that qualitative methods allow for
human experience to be captured with depth, breadth, and authenticity. Moreover,
qualitative designs allow for an emergent and flexible design, meaning that the researcher
can adapt the questions and other data collection mechanisms in accordance to each
participant’s account. Given the intricate and complex nature of M&As, this research
design was considered appropriate for allowing the researcher to capture and examine
each project with all its nuances. Research interviewing, in particular, enables the
researcher to probe participants’ responses in depth as needed.
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Research Sample
The population of this study consisted of 12 individuals, each of whom played a
key role in their company’s M&A, meaning he or she was integral to the decision making
process regarding the effort and held a leadership role throughout it.
Participants for this study were contacted using a combination of convenience and
snowball sampling techniques. The researcher asked her own contacts in the leadership
teams of M&As to participate in the study and additionally asked for names of others
who have been involved as the key person on an M&A team, thus “snowballing”
participation. As names were collected, the researcher contacted each potential
participant regarding their interest in participating in the study. A total of 20 potential
participants were contacted. Of those, 12 met the criteria for the study and agreed to
participate. The researcher outlined the purpose and requirements for the study and
scheduled the interview date.
Protection of Human Subjects
Approval to conduct the proposed research study was obtained from Pepperdine
University’s Institutional Review Board on October 5, 2012. The researcher also
completed the training course, “Protecting Human Research Participants,” offered by the
National Institutes of Health, Office of Extramural Research, on December 24, 2011.
Prior to the collection of any data, the researcher contacted each potential
participant via email with a brief overview of the study’s purpose and a description of
what participation would involve. Interviews were scheduled with each participant upon
receiving approval to conduct the study from the institutional review board. Interviews
were scheduled to take place either on the telephone or in-person at a mutually agreeable
and private location, such as a conference room or private office of either the researcher
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or the participant. Prior to collecting any data from individual research participants, a
cover letter explaining the research project (see Appendix A) and a consent form (see
Appendix B) were presented. Each participant was asked to thoroughly review each form
and encouraged to ask any questions he or she may have before signing the consent form.
Once the signature was provided, the researcher gave a signed and dated copy of the
cover letter and consent form to the participant.
There was no cost to the participants to participate in this study, nor was any
financial incentive given for doing so. The only inconvenience was the time taken for the
interview. All participant data was kept confidential, and no identifying information was
reported in the research or will be reported in any future publication of the results. The
data were maintained securely during the data collection by remaining in the possession
of the researcher at all times.
Once data collection was completed, all hard copy information was stored in a
locked file cabinet at a secured facility belonging to the researcher, and all digital
information was stored in a password protected file on a computer that only the
researcher has access to. These materials will be kept in this location for 5 years
following the study and then destroyed. An abstract of the study was provided to
individual participants upon request.
Data Collection
Data were collected using semi-structured interviews (Punch, 2005). The
researcher created the interview script and suggested prompts (see Appendix C) based on
her review of the relevant literature. As is common in semi-structured interviews, the
guide served as a prompt rather than a definitive protocol, and in interviewing
participants, the researcher did not necessarily ask all of the questions or ask them in
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order, particularly if the interviewee was providing pertinent responses without being
prompted. Questions were adapted based on the participant’s role in the M&A, the
success of the endeavor, and the flow of the conversation. The researcher asked questions
regarding the factors reported in the literature as necessary for successful integration, and
used probing follow-up questions to gain clarification and explore participants’
responses. Using a qualitative interview enabled the researcher to understand the
participants’ experiences from their own viewpoint, rather then imposing a structure on
the information based upon the researcher’s own point of view (Punch, 2005).
Interviews were conducted in-person or on the telephone, and lasted
approximately 60 to 90 minutes per participant. In-person interviews were scheduled at a
mutually agreeable location that would allow for interview privacy, such as a conference
room at the researcher’s workplace. The researcher asked permission to record all
interviews and did so when the participant granted permission. Ten participants granted
permission; however, the audio recording failed in two cases, yielding eight recorded
interviews. The researcher additionally took notes during the discussion. All interview
data was kept private by labeling each company with a letter, and ensuring any
identifying information, including all recorded and written notes were kept in a secure
file cabinet or computer file to which only the researcher had access. The following day
the researcher sent a thank you email to each participant, thanking them for taking part in
the study (see Appendix D).
Data Analysis
Data analysis began by creating complete transcripts or notes for each interview.
Content analysis was used to examine the data, using the following steps based on Miles,
Huberman, and Saldaña (2013):
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1. The researcher read and reread each transcript several times to familiarize
herself with the data.
2. The researcher then conducted initial coding for each transcript or set of notes
one by one. Initial coding involved isolating the meaning units and assigning a
code or theme to them, such as “Making the layoff package too rich can
undermine engagement.”
3. Upon completion of the initial coding, the researcher examined the codes to
identify similar codes and determine what broader themes they reflect. For
example, “rationale for change” and “short- and long-term vision” both
reflected the “content of communication” about the M&A. This step resulted
in a hierarchy of codes and code groupings.
4. When the coding was completed, the researcher reviewed the results to assure
that the codes were mutually exclusive and their wording best reflected the
data mapped to each code.
5. The researcher then noted the saturation levels for each code and identified
sample quotes for each.
6. As a final step, a second rater examined the analysis. She reviewed and
discussed the results with the researcher to detect any bias in the interpretation
or reporting. The results were adjusted as needed.
Summary
This chapter outlined the methods used to gather and analyze data for this study.
The study utilized a qualitative research interviewing design. Twelve individuals who
played a key role in a private sector M&A were interviewed about their experiences
related to six M&A best practices suggested in the literature. Content analysis was used
to analyze the qualitative data. The next chapter presents the results.
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Chapter 4
Results
This chapter reports the results of the study. First, a rich description of each
participant is provided to help contextualize the results. Second, participants’ views
regarding the dynamics of M&As are presented. Third, participants’ evaluation of the
M&A success factors examined in the present research are reported. Fourth, additional
unanticipated findings emerging from the data are presented.
Participant Descriptions and M&A Experiences
Twelve participants were interviewed for this study. Most participants played
roles in one or two M&As, although two participants were involved in four or five M&As
and a final participant had participated in 50 to 55 M&A deals (see Table 1). Twelve
specific M&As described by the participants were in the Petroleum industry, two
involved an Internet Information Provider, and the remaining M&As were in the Mobile
Communications, Plastics, Publishing, Real Estate, and Software industries.
The M&A projects participants took part in were initiated for various reasons (see
Table 2). Five participants cited the reason of organizational growth. Amanda explained,
“The idea was that they then had the largest combined asset value in Canada, which
would provide some security for the combination as a large Canadian company and
prevent them from being bought out by an American company.”
Three participants cited the reason of acquiring desired technology. Bart
explained,
The main point [of the acquisition] was [for the company] to acquire [our]
technology, the piece of technology we were working on. This particular start-up
had a patented technology that I was actually involved in. We knew that might be
a reason why someone might wanna acquire us. In fact, they’d told us that their
main purpose of acquiring us was acquiring that technology.
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Table 1
Participant Profiles
Participant
Bart
Donna
Chuck
Amanda
Sally

Eugene
Frank
George
Paul

Sam
Tom
Walter

M&A Experience
1 acquisition, 2006, Petroleum
(software) industry
1 acquisition, 2010, Petroleum
industry
1 acquisition, 2006, High Tech
industries
1 acquisition, 2007, Petroleum
industry
2 acquisitions:
2009 (publishing industry, 2012
(mobile communications industry)
1 acquisition, 1998, real estate
industry
5 acquisitions: 1986-1987, 19971998, 2009 (Petroleum industry)
50-55 acquisition deals, software
industry
2 mergers: 1997-1998, 2009
(petroleum industry
2 acquisitions: 2003 (industry), 2010
(plastics industry)
1 merger, 1997-1998, Petroleum
industry
1 merger, 2009, Petroleum industry
2 acquisitions: 2008, 2009 (Internet
Information Provider)

Role
Start-up employee who was acquired. Involved in
integration of the technology teams
Led the human resources team
Investment banker, corporate development, HR (over
24 years). Mostly involved in initiating the deals
Senior executive at acquiring company
Member of business consultancy team

Post-merger integration team member
Managed benefits, member of change management
team
Diligence, integration planning, integration lead
Post-merger integration team member (1998, 2009,
2003), change consultant to the chief executive officer
(2010)
Vice President of HR, member of integration team
Senior director for corporate environmental safety,
member of integration team
Integration team member

Table 2
Reasons For Acquisition
Reason
Organizational growth
Acquire desired technology
Acquire intellectual property
Acquire organizational capability
Exchange funding for physical resources
Diversify into a new market
None stated
Note. Based on 21 total responses from the 12 participants

n
5
3
3
1
1
1
7

Three additional participants cited the reason of acquiring intellectual property.
Sally shared,
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[My company’s] objectives were different. We weren’t doing an M&A to cut
costs, but to get [intellectual property]. They would acquire a company that had
[intellectual property] that was attractive. Then they’d buy it, get access to the
authors and [intellectual property]. They weren’t looking for the people.
Other stated reasons for the M&As, each cited by one participant, were to acquire
organizational capability, exchange funding for physical resources, and diversify into a
new market. Participants did not state explicit reasons for the M&A for seven of the
efforts they described.
Participants were asked to describe some of the project features of their M&A that
were specific to the present inquiry (see Table 3). Only three participants specified that
an integration manager was used in their M&A, and one of these emphasized that this
role was not carried out effectively. Bart explained,
The next week started by having an integration manager assigned to how the
acquisition would go, and that was also the beginning of the downfall. I think it
was a good idea, probably, to have an integration manager, but the problem we
had [is] we got maybe two reports from the integration manager, talking about
how the integration works and what was going on: one when he started and one
about 2 weeks later. And every single time, he put some deadlines and things, and
he circled back and told us about what was going to happen with the integration,
but those deadlines were never hit. So we didn’t really hear much about the
integration work that was going on from the integration manager.
Ten participants stated that their projects involved an integration team. Donna, for
example, explained,
We had a 30-person integration team for a company of 500 people being
integrations. There were 25 [of our] people on the integration team, IT, financial,
operations, etc., all with a counterpart on the other side.
Three participants stated that their company did cultural due diligence. They each
qualified their response, however, by adding that they believed the results were
ignored.
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Table 3
Project Features
Feature
n
Integration manager used
No answer
18
Yes
3
Integration team used
No answer
3
Yes
18
Cultural due diligence performed
No answer
8
Yes (results ignored)
3
No
10
Cultural integration conducted
No answer
6
Yes
5
No
5
Note. Based on 21 total responses from the 12 participants

Ten participants explicitly stated that cultural due diligence was not performed.
Paul shared his experience with this exercise:
[Cultural due diligence] was talked about at the very top end, but it didn’t get any
due attention in the end. On all of the due diligence checklists, there is culture,
there are people practices, there are [human resources] policies. I mean in due
diligence you are supposed to go through that big checklist. I’m assuming that
people do, like people within our organizations do. But they don’t do anything
with it, but they do go through the due diligence checklist and then leave it.
Five participants stated that cultural integration was conducted, while five other
participants stated that their projects did not address this aspect. George explained that his
company addressed cultural integration by proactively identifying “pain” points for
acquired employees and developing an integration plan for those:
At the end of the day, there’s a reality that they need to be aware of and willing to
accept. So there’s plenty of work on the integration side, which is you want there
to be a smooth transition into a different environment, you want to be mindful
about where you think the pain points would be and address those proactively and
very programmatically. But at the end of the day, unless there’s a merger of
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people or your acquisition strategy warrants a complete stand alone of the
acquired company, it’s hard to shave a small entity from kind of a big enterprise.
[Over time the company will need to fit into the acquired company’s culture and
learn to adapt to that].
In contrast, Frank shared,
I have no recollection of an effort to merge the cultures. [The acquired company]
was established and had mature business processes. It was bigger in every way. [The
acquiring company] was very entrepreneurial. People divided themselves by color. . . . It
was like a little fish eating a shark. . . . Definitely there were some feelings hurt.
Participants were asked about the results of their M&A projects. Participants
evaluated the organizational, people, and integration outcomes of their projects (see
Table 4). Participants reported positive organizational outcomes for 12 of the 21 projects
they had engaged in. In Walter’s case, he reflected that failure was not an option for the
company due to the amount they had invested in the project:
In terms of genuine success or failure, I’m not sure this was much of an option for
failure just because of the amount of money that was spent. I think it just would
have turned into more and more drastic decisions in terms of how to structure the
team, in terms of what to offer the client in order to keep them, in order to grow
that business. I think certain products would have been killed, obviously; but
ultimately, given the move that [the acquiring company] was making in that
phase, they needed to just figure out a way to do it. [So it absolutely just had to
work and we were going to muddle through it no matter how.]
Table 4
Merger and Acquisition Results
Integration
Organizational People
outcome
outcome Outcome
Poor outcome
7
8
6
Positive outcome
12
4
2
Uncertain outcome
1
5
7
No answer
1
4
5
Note. Based on 21 total responses from the 12 participants
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Seven participants reported negative organizational outcomes. Bart, who was
acquired from a start-up, shared,
I’m pretty sure it was not successful. I know that there were some internal
numbers, specific to [our acquired product] that the technology would generate.
And I know that we didn’t hit them. . . . There were also some expected
milestones about releasing new version of the software and those we did reach.
Although, if you have a software you can’t sell, that doesn’t really matter as
much. The company still exists, they’re still number 3, number 4 in the
technology market, they’re still selling the original technology that they acquired
[my company] for, and I hear its actually creating more revenues for them
nowadays. But, it could have been much better, we could actually have taken on
[our larger competitors].
Responses were quite varied in terms of people outcomes. Eight participants
stated that the M&A resulted in substantial people costs. Amanda shared,
You almost felt embarrassed to admit who you worked for at the time. The
emotional side was hard, and led to a lot of burnout. The cuts lasted about 2 years.
They continually had to keep cutting as the financial performance dropped.
They’d started with about 6,500 employees and ended 2 years later with 2,500.
However, because of the timing of the merger, and the fact that other jobs were
hard to find at the time, very few people actually walked in the first few years.
They wanted to be laid off [to get the payout], but if they weren’t, they fell into
wait-and-see mode and hunkered down. They were almost like prisoners. Then
they went through a series of layoffs over the next 2 years, and there was still
overlap of roles in shared services, and they sold and wound up various divisions
and business units. From a morale perspective, the whole thing was very negative.
By then, they’d gone through three leaders in a year.
In contrast, four participants noted their M&As had very positive people
outcomes. Donna commented, “Afterwards, [human resources] was congratulated on how
smoothly it went and on the knowledge and capability the brought to the integration.”
Six participants noted that poor results were achieved in terms of integration.
Most of these participants noted that a discernible division remains between the
employees from the companies involved. Walter, for example, explained,
Ever since we merged into [the acquiring company], you can still tell who the
[acquired] people are because they do work primarily on [the acquired] products. .
. . I would say it’s not fully merged yet. . . . working on it’s either maybe 60% or
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70% there because there still a lot of product limitation and a lot of technical
knowledge that they do need for [that company] that you can’t just pick up and
sort of publish all the products that they use across [the acquiring company]. . . .
Over time, there’s been a lot of that pulling together [of the two groups,] but there
was never an end in sight. . . . So it’s probably a couple of years off.
Perceived Dynamics of Mergers and Acquisitions
In sharing their experiences of M&As, the participants described the general
dynamics of these efforts (see Table 5). Five participants expressed that the acquiring
company always has the upper hand in the deal. Bart explained that in the M&A in which
he was involved, the acquiring company had the power to decide which parts of the
company would be integrated and which parts would be divested.
Table 5
Dynamics of Mergers and Acquisitions
Theme
Acquiring company always has the upper hand
Long process
Organized in phases
Phase 1: Due Diligence and Confirm Investment
Phase 2: Integration Planning
Phase 3: Drive the Integration
Lack of planning is common
Difficulty varies based on the style of acquisition
N = 12

n
5
2
2

1
1

Reflecting on the cultural integration associated with his acquisition, George
shared,
I think the learning there for us had been, not just on [this acquisition], but I think
on most deals, number 1: we are a large organization. And the reality, law of large
numbers is, any small acquisition, even if they had 50-100 people, will pale in
comparison to the 70, 80, or 90,000 people that we have.
Two participants emphasized that any M&A is a long process. Chuck shared that
after an integration plan is created, it is important to consider whether the time frame is
realistic based on the amount of change being accomplished. He explained,
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You look at that plan and you say, “Can the organization absorb this much change
that fast?” Again, you proceed with it but if you think it’s going to be disruptive
to the business—or overly disruptive (all integration is disruptive)—it may be you
rethink it and maybe you stage things in a longer way to these things. So if you
have an opportunity to elongate activities, maybe you choose to do that. Well it
sounds as if – those cases where you have the opportunity to stretch things out. I
haven’t seen those be more productive than just going ahead and doing things that
are normal project plan based.
George, who has been involved in 50-55 acquisition deals in the software
industry, outlined three phases in which M&As typically occur. Regarding Phase 1, Due
Diligence and Confirming the Investment, he explained,
Diligence is across the board or across the entire enterprise, risk management,
understanding what kind of risks and liabilities the company is taking on. It’s
managing the risk, making sure we’re not taking on anything . . . that we’d be
surprised by or that people may not be comfortable taking on. Can it be confirmed
and validated to really make sure we’re getting what we think we’re getting? It’s
basically validating the business, and that’s really done in diligence.
The second phase is integration planning. He explained,
We take the learnings we’ve had about the company in our group, our group of
venture information which includes all the functional experts I mentioned earlier,
basically take all the information and say how do we build an integration plan for
an acquisition. This is obviously in consult with what the sponsoring business
wants to do with the acquisition, coupled with what we’ve found about the
company. There’s kind of a second body of work, which is building up an
integration plan for an acquisition. [This includes making the decisions not only
around what systems will move forward and how the systems will integrate, but
also surrounding how the people and which people and what that looks like,
where they’re sitting, how and when they’re transitioning into the company. We]
. . . try to upstream a lot of that activity, so when we’re building up the integration
plan . . . so going into a final approval meeting, we have a pretty good sense of
what we’re going to do with . . . every large group of people . . . and in many
cases if the deal has fallen off, at the individual name level.
Phase 3 involves driving the actual integration. Three participants described this
phase. George explained that this phase involves
driving and owning the initial execution of the integration. [This] occurs once we
get to close on the acquisition or the transaction that’s now owned by [the
company. This involves] . . . making sure the potential systems tie, all our legal
systems tie, all our back office systems tie, making sure that there’s a smooth
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transition for customers coming in to [the company], and then there’s a smooth
transition for them to be mainstreamed into [our] ecosystem.
Tom and Eugene added that this phase involves ongoing performance monitoring
and reporting. Tom described the approach used during his merger experience:
We identified the synergies we expected at the time of the merger, and then postmerger we were accountable to monitor, track, and report those synergies. So that
was a key part I think to being successful, which, process wise, was done really
well. So keeping that structure straight through the merger where you had the
business and the functional areas each having a lead to report on those things
happened straight through 6 months. [This] got reported by the chief executive
officer on a regular basis. There was monthly reporting we had to do. So because
I was a corporate leader I had that responsibility in my post merger plan. It was to
report on those synergies.
Additionally, Sam commented that M&As often suffer from a lack of planning,
while Sally emphasized that the difficulty inherent any particular M&A is contingent
upon the type of acquisition it is. For example, she explained that when the large
publishing house acquired a small publishing house located in another state, the acquiring
organization
just got the revenue and [experienced] very little change to the organization.
Because there’s not much difference in the processes, there’s not much integration
needed. They move over some processes – IT, payroll, etc, but there’s not too
much work involved in that and they get someone from the functional area to do
it. There’s no question – they just impose [the acquiring organization’s] way.
M&A Success Factors
Analysis of participants’ responses pointed to recommendations regarding the six
primary types of success factors examined in this study: cultural due diligence and
integration, integration planning, integration managers, integration teams, communication
practices, and leadership support. The following sections describe the findings related to
these success factors. Examination of the participants’ responses identified additional
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findings related to M&As and facilitating engagement during M&As. These findings are
reported within this section.
Cultural due diligence and integration. Participants’ views and
recommendations regarding cultural due diligence varied somewhat (see Table 6). Five
participants emphasized that cultural similarity promotes M&A success and mismatch
can lead to M&A failure. Amanda explained that in her experience,
The two cultures of the two companies could not have been more different:
Company K was a people-centric company that focused on leadership and
development for its people. It was highly collaborative. Company T was more
influencing and separate . . . and so the two sets of people didn’t know how to
work together. There hadn’t been any pre-work on culture, it just hadn’t existed.
The decision criteria was not around people, it was about making a big company
that was immune to a US takeover.
Table 6
Cultural Due Diligence
Theme
Cultural similarity promotes M&A success, while mismatch can lead to M&A failure
Cultural exploration or audit is important; due diligence not always needed
Awareness of culture is not always necessary
N = 12

n
5
2
1

Frank commented that in his merger experience,
Corporate cultures clashed. On paper, it was a match made in heaven: the two
businesses were highly complementary. [One company] had in the previous years
spent over $1 million on leadership, interpersonal development, conflict
resolution training and skill development. Everyone took training in interpersonal
skill development, improving human effectiveness through the Mahler Institute.
This was unprecedented at the time and had a strong effect on the company
culture. They would focus on process, content, feelings, and balancing all three.
[The other company was . . . dog eat dog, a survival of the fittest culture.
Walter observed in his company how this kind of cultural mismatch affected
employees post-M&A: “There were definitely some people for the first year and a half
that were very much hating [the acquiring company], very much thought that [it] was
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destroying the culture of [the smaller, acquired start-up]. Ultimately the majority ended
up leaving.”
Thus, according to these participants, culture plays an enormous impact on the
M&A and on the company following the M&A. Nevertheless, two participants specified
that while cultural exploration or audit is important, due diligence not always needed.
Chuck elaborated,
In practice, it’s a low item on the analysis list. The only times I’ve seen it stop a
deal are when this culture it’s one where it borders on unethical behaviors. I’ve
seen deals stop because of that but, I’ve never seen deals stop because “Hey, they
just have a different culture than we do.” I’ve seen deals that have different
cultures work, when both parties recognize there is a different culture and work
on their differences—where the differences are pretty clearly articulated and you
kind of know what needs. What one or two or three things need to change in order
for this business to be successful, in the acquiring company’s environment. . . .
[on the other hand,] if you go into it blindly and down play a lot of these big
culture differences, it really inhibits the acquisition. I think the acquisition can be
successful, but the odds are stacked against you.
This participant additionally stressed that cultural information needs to be
gathered in a timely manner if it is to be useful; thus, making cultural exploration more
useful than a more extended cultural due diligence effort:
This has to be done really fast and so you need it like before you close essentially.
Even if that’s only 75% right but this data becomes less valuable really quickly. . .
. [During one experience, we did a] fairly exhaustive culture survey of the target
company that was pretty lengthy. We did a lot of interviews with people, things
like that, and the results of those surveys were available about four months after
we closed. While they were interesting, by the time that we got the information,
the integration was three quarters of the way done, so it did us no good
whatsoever. It was a good historical document but we couldn’t leverage it for any
benefit. So we learnt from that experience and then the deal we were undertaking
of, rather than kind of doing a big exhaustive survey. During the diligence period
before we signed the agreement to acquire the company, we began thinking about
some, I guess what you can say, culture attributes, like how are decisions made?
How are things communicated? Things like that, and then comparing that to
ourselves. So that by the time we actually signed and announced the deal, we had
some hypotheses about what the gaps were. Also some hypotheses about where it
was going to be, where the culture of the target, specific attributes of their culture
was going to be potentially an inhibitor to our success in an integration.
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Sally provided a contrasting view, explaining that in cases where a large company
is acquiring a small company,
[The larger company’s culture is] just dominant. They impose their culture. It
doesn’t matter what the acquired company’s culture is. They have to learn the
[acquiring company’s] one or they can look for a new role. People don’t always
love the approach, but [my company] doesn’t feel like it makes much of a
difference.
Participants’ responses about cultural integration pointed three general principles
(see Table 7). These included keeping in mind present and future needs (n = 3), human
resources personnel needing to partner with business leaders in this phase (n = 2), and
that the lack of cultural integration can lead to failure of the M&A effort (n = 2).
Table 7
Cultural integration
Theme
General Principles
Keep in mind present and future needs
Human resources needs to partner with business leaders in this phase
Lack of cultural integration can lead to merger or acquisition failure
Activities
Make retention, severance, retirement decisions
Provide information and reassurance to managers and employees about their job
security
Deliberately assess culture
Create culture integration plan
Plan compensation
N = 12

n
3
2
2
11
8
3
3
2

For example, Donna, who led the HR aspect of her M&A, explained,
When adding the new people, you need to know how many others you’re adding
on, what the business needs to support it. Like if you’re growing the business by
10%, you know you need 10% more people in support. So now, instead of 50
finance guys, we needed 55. So we had to find 5 in their team. You have to know
what skill sets you need ahead of time. You have to have planned it.
Donna additionally emphasized the critical role that human resources plays in
M&As, outlining the need for them to partner with business leaders:
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HR needs to be a partner, involved in due diligence, and involved in the
integration. Acquisitions are a time for HR to shine and show their value. It takes
courage to step up and do what’s right. You need to take a step back, believe in
what you’re doing and help people. You need to show strong leadership,
decisiveness, empathy and communication skills.
Paul added,
I think [human resources] has a huge role to play and in my experience, they
usually do not play it well. They do not rise to the challenge. . . . I mean [human
resources] professionals just do a good job of interviewing people and doing
payroll. Making sure that they have employee numbers and that they are enrolled
in their benefits programs and that they’ve managed all the pension risks
associated with acquisitions. But very rarely in my experience has sort of had
[human resources] professionals who are fundamental business partners at the
table, supporting and championing good people integration, very rare. When they
are, it looks like lots of courage for addressing often times the unspoken tensions
that are in the room, which are cultural. It looks like bringing forward a business
case for paying attention to integration. Not just saying we need to do it because
it’s a good idea or the academics recommend it. But doing it because
fundamentally you could put a premium on the stock price which is, typically in
acquisitions you’ve probably noticed that the share price doesn’t spike, it’s good
enough if it doesn’t fall.
Two participants additionally stressed that lack of cultural integration can lead to
M&A failure. Paul elaborated,
Well I think that’s our job to show that the bottom line is seriously impacted by
not paying attention and not investing [in culture]. In paying attention to culture,
you can get a return on any investment that you make in doing that good work.
That’s very hard to quantify and you need a leader who’s open to that.
The participants identified six specific activities that were involved in cultural
integration: making retention, severance, and retirement decisions (n = 11); providing
information and reassurance to managers and employees about their job security (n = 8);
deliberately assessing culture (n = 3); creating a culture integration plan (n = 3); planning
compensation (n = 2); and providing coaching to leaders on how to handle the change (n
= 1). The remainder of this section describes the two most commonly reported activities.
Making retention, severance, and retirement decisions was identified as a central
piece of integration, as it is necessary during an M&A to determine who would remain
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post-M&A, who would leave the company, and on what terms under which departing
employees would leave. George explained,
Early on, the [human resources] team leads an effort with the appropriate
management levels at the target company to understand the roles and
responsibilities of individuals. And it’s done twofold: one, to understand the
impact there may be on their role, especially if there’s somebody doing that role
at [the acquiring company] and that activity will be assumed by somebody at [the
acquiring company], and then two, is also to figure out how they would come into
the [acquiring company’s] system: how they place, how they level, how a [human
resources] person would [interpret their work]: does what they do align to the
[acquiring company’s] taxonomy. And that’s through discussions about what their
with their management; what they do, how they work, all that. So it’s more about
the role than the individual. It certainly takes into the individual, but it’s primarily
about the role: what’s the job function. And then you can have a separate
discussion about the individual. [when this happens] depends on the deal, depends
on the comfort level of the executive team. Preference would be to try and do it
pre close, but sometimes they’re not comfortable, so we’ll do it post close.
Chuck advises a similar process of assuring that the desired people are carried
forward from the acquired company:
So usually what you try to do is identify a handful of people that are critical
before you sign up a deal. Get them to commit to the deal before you signed. So
you’re just going to base this on your diligence findings and your interactions
with them. Also, most often you’ll talk to the [chief executive officer] about who
they think is 100% critical to make their business succeed or not. You talk to the
[chief executive officer] and you can say, “Alright well we’re buying this because
we want to take your product and push it through our sales channels” for instance.
So the [research and development] team is critical, the head of our engineering,
the chief technology officer. Those guys are really critical to our success because
not only are they just the inventors of the products, but they also have in their
heads what it’ll look like. What the next generation of the products are going to
look like, so they are absolutely critical. In order to keep business from that
company, the sales and marketing people are important, probably not as important
as the [research and development] people but important nonetheless.
In Donna’s acquisition, the company used a detailed planning and interviewing
process to assure appropriate fit for the new organization:
We interviewed all 500 people [from the acquired company] and decided who
would fit the culture within 3 weeks of the deal being announced. [In the
interviews,] we’re looking for their reactions: what’s their expertise, desire, or
ability to live and work in our culture?
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For Donna’s team, cultural fit was of critical importance. Therefore, employees
who were not perceived to be a fit were not brought over, even if that meant leaving a
position open:
The managers would sometimes complain, or say that they needed a person, and
my response was that we’ll find them externally after we’re done if we have to.
But we didn’t want the managers hiring the wrong person, and I told them that if
we did, then they’d have a bad performer on their team, and have other problems,
and then have to come back and tell me that they wanted to terminate this person.
And then I explained that we didn’t want to have to pay severance for the wrong
person, and that [the acquired company] was paying the packages for the people
we didn’t want to hire. And I told the managers that we’d be having a very
different conversation with me if they hired them and the person didn’t work out
and we had to pay for it, even though we knew upfront they wouldn’t be a fit.
Those who fit were given an offer of employment, while those who were not a fit were
offered a retirement plan, a short-term position to aid the transition, or a severance
package: “if they weren’t a fit, we didn’t hire them. We made the decision to only bring
people over to [the acquiring company] who fit. Our mandate was to get the people who
do.”
Sam and Amanda cautioned that during this process, severance packages should
be planned carefully. Amanda explained that making the layoff package too rich can
undermine engagement. In her experience,
The majority of the merger layoffs had happened within a year, but the cuts then
continued for another year thereafter anyway. People actually wanted to be laid
off, because the packages being given were so generous. The financial viability of
this scheme is questionable, particularly when they were doing so poorly
financially. However, people took advantage of it and tried to get laid off, or
offered to. There were good intentions to the layoff program, it was just that it
actually drove disengagement. We wanted to support people and treat them well
and fairly and give some dignity to layoff. But we probably actually overdid it.
Eight participants emphasized the importance of providing information and
reassurance to managers and employees about their job security. Donna pointed out that
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managers, just like employees, can become nervous about their future at the company
during M&As:
We need to remember that managers are people too, and they have all the same
worries. You need them to be focused on the integration, or the systems, or the
business, but they’re wondering what their severance would look like. We need to
be clear and make decisions quickly, and then hold the manager’s hand and
provide answers and materials to help them. Everyone’s nervous.
Bart, who was part of start-up that had been acquired, additionally pointed out
that lack of career pathing—whether actual or perceived—can undermine engagement
during this phase:
I know a few guys left because they thought that we were second-class citizens
within the company… although I don’t know if I agree with that or not, it’s true
that while I was there, no one ever got promoted from the [acquired company]
side. Lots of new people becoming vice presidents, directors, etc., but no one ever
from [the acquired company]. I think that was another frustration point, and
people thought they needed to go somewhere else.
Integration planning. Analysis of the participants’ responses regarding
integration planning and timeline pointed to five activities (see Table 8). These included
creating a thorough but adaptable plan (n = 6), customizing the plan to the situation and
the culture (n = 3), and treating integration as an ongoing process (n = 2).
Table 8
Integration Plan and Timeline
Theme
Create a thorough but adaptable plan
Plan must be customized to the situation and culture
Treat integration as an ongoing process
N = 12

n
6
3
2

Six participants emphasized the importance of having a thorough, carefully
architected plan. Eugene described the process used in his experience:
[To plan it, we’d get] the management team in a room, basically talking about ok,
so based on what we think is going to happen, lets go through how we think we
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need to roll out. . . . We’d determine a variety of scenarios based on the business
objectives, and then we’d probably determine the most likely scenario, and then
where’s the one with the highest risk, where we may not want to commit to as
concrete messages. Where we would say know that there was still some
ambiguity if there was any. . . . What was successful about that acquisition, I think
again it comes down to planning. It sounds ridiculous, but plan the plan. You just
have to keep people focused on the items that matter, because during an
acquisition, people will get entirely distracted by things that are immaterial. You
have to be sensitive to the fact that they may be important to those individuals, but
at the same time, big picture thinking is harder to come by. People get tied up in
“Where is my office going to be,” and “which country” and you know, whether I
have a corner office or a middle office takes on crazy importance depending on
culturally how the company works overall. You know, things that I don’t care
about you may care about more. And taking the time to understand things like
that.
George echoed that making the plan, executing according to the plan, and
adapting the plan as needed is critical:
You have a plan going in, and then you execute against the plan. Obviously stuff
happens, environment changes, key leaders decide to leave, key employees are
not happy, and then you adjust and adapt and make whatever changes need to be
made to continue to go down you path. Integration is clearly not a straight road.
Somebody who’s done integration knows that, because it is full of winds,
roadblocks, bumps… I mean the joke I used to have was: integration is not a
paved road, it’s a gravel road, it’s going to be a little bumpy. It’s just the nature of
the beast. In some respects, inherent in your design is going to be change, and
how do I respond. And that I think is the pain of integration, but it’s also the fun
of integration. Like I had no idea what’s going to happen tomorrow. Just when I
think I have control of everything, I lose control.
Three participants emphasized that the plan must be customized to the situation
and culture. Donna elaborated,
You have to determine your approach by the situation. We didn’t want [to carry
over] the wrong person [from the acquired organization if they didn’t fit our
culture], but it was 2010. We had that luxury of finding people if we needed them.
If it was 2006, we probably would have hired them, because if they’re a pretty
good worker and not a cancer on the organization. There was no one to hire
externally, the job market was saturated. So that would have been different. It
comes down to dollars and cents. We had determined that [the acquired company]
was liable for severance, so we wanted to get it right.
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Two participants finally pointed out that integration needs to be treated as an
ongoing process. Eugene reflected on his experience:
It felt like it went on for years. . . . It felt like it was an ongoing, just when you
thought things would settle down. So I would say it probably lasted, probably
months for things to get settled down. So from the beginning, the most intensity
was kind of like a one to two week period, and then things just kind of normalized
a little bit depending on the waves. Everybody strives to be like “Hey we’d like to
be at this phase by this month” and I would argue that there are certainly aspects
that get done in the first 100 days, probably the biggest parts get done relatively
quickly. It’s the residual parts that sometimes lingers on for years, and if you
don’t keep track of some of the smaller but important pieces, it can impact
business overall.
Integration managers and teams. When asked about integration managers and
teams, only two participants stated that this position was essential for success (see Table
9). For example, Paul explained his view, adding that this manager must have executivelevel support:
I do believe in integration managers. The ones that I’ve seen work probably [the
integration manager is in that role] a minimum of over a year. I think they are
really pretty important, but they have to have some knowledge and some passion
for the people in times of change. They just can’t be really good engineers. The
best you can do is to bring a group of committed people, get serious leadership
support and strive to figure out what would be the interventions that would have
the most impact. . . . If you have an integration manager and then you have the
executive, the integration manager has to sit on the executive group. Because
otherwise what happens is, the executive makes decisions and the integration
manager has to justify for all the employees. As opposed to being right at the table
to say, “If you make that decision, here is the impact it’s going to have on
people.”
Four themes emerged regarding the roles and activities of the integration team.
These themes were that team members need to be paired one-to-one with an integration
partner on the other side (n = 5), the team should be cross-functional and crossorganizational (n = 4), the team should be dedicated to the effort and have carefully
outlined roles and responsibilities (n = 4), and team members should receive special
reward and recognition (n = 3).
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Table 9
Integration Manager and Team
Theme
Integration manager essential for success
Integration Team
Team members need to be paired one-to-one with an integration partner on the
other side
Team should be cross-functional and cross-organizational
Team should be dedicated to the effort and have carefully outlined roles and
responsibilities
Team members should receive special reward and recognition
N = 12

n
2
5
4
4
3

Donna shared her experience regarding the importance of integration partners:
Another key, and something you never read about in the textbooks, is that your
relationships with the other company’s HR people matter a lot. The reality is, you
need to work in that relationship, and you need them to give you information, to
tell you about their employees, and the problems they’ve had with some and the
good people. The textbooks never tell you that, but it matters. Each member of the
integration team had his or her counterpart from the other organization to help the
transition occur smoothly.
In Tom’s acquisition, the partnering occurred at the executive level:
There was a mechanism to meet with these executive leaders, to get them
together. They were joined at the hip for 6 months, all the way through to manage
the integration out the other side. So that integration structure of two executive
leads stayed intact for six months post-merger to manage and report to the
executive, to the board and to external stakeholders the progress on the merger.
Additionally, four participants pointed out that, to heighten the effectiveness of
the M&A, the integration team needs to be staffed from across both organizations and
across the various functions. In Tom’s experience,
Each executive leadership team was asked to identify for each business area and
each functional area an expert experienced leader from that area. The two sides
. . . each assigned a lead for the parallel business areas and the parallel functions.
So I believe there is probably 12 or 14 people at the senior director general
manager or vice president level that came together weekly to start the integration
process ahead of merger approval.
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Participants also emphasized the all-consuming nature of M&A work. For that
reason, they believed that the integration team be fully dedicated to the effort and
determine what they are and are not responsible for. Eugene explained,
The thing is, with any integration, it’s hugely disruptive to a normal course of
business, so you know, as you get closer to having an integration, you have to
dedicate a team and strip away their duties from a day to day basis. You can’t
actually expect them to do the normal course of business. You have to find
interim solutions for people to be managed, if that means reallocating
responsibility and management, it’s impossible for someone trying to run an
integration to actually be accountable for day-to-day business. Not impossible, but
if they’re touching the acquisition on a daily basis, then they really shouldn’t be
trying to. . . . If their job was already 100%, they’re working at capacity, it’s
unrealistic. Because the priority will always end up being an acquisition, it’s one
of those things, when you acquire, everyone always thinks it needs to be done as
fast as humanly possible. Because you’re trying to minimize the amount of
influence on the company or disruption to normal course of business. Of course
some people know, and it’s always going to be slightly disruptive, so the faster
you can get back to business, the better it is for everybody. But I mean people are
pretty reasonable for the most, at least I’ve been lucky enough to work at
companies that are pretty reasonable that when that’s the circumstance, everybody
understands that integration is not a walk in the park, and it has to be the priority.
You know companies, especially public companies are going to be expected to
start delivering on the promises that have been made, or the justification that’s
been made in the synergies of the deal, so, it’s important.
Because the substantial effort and responsibilities involved with being on the
integration team, three participants stated that team members should receive special
reward and recognition. Donna explained,
At first, you put people on the team, and it’s exciting, and there’s not a lot of
pushback: people want to be involved in the important work and they feel like
what they’re doing is important. The excitement wears off, and people get
exhausted and it gets tedious after a time. I can think of every acquisition I’ve
been in… and I just, there’s a breaking point and it’s just exhausting, and I just
end up shutting my office door and I cry. And I’m not much of a crier at work.
It’s just, it gets to be a lot. You end up working endlessly. We worked for 3
months with no time off, no breaks. In my experience, compensation for it has
always been after the fact, as a thank you. This is cultural piece though: you have
to look after and thank them. We gave awards – bonuses and weekends away. It’s
not a perfect science, people are in different roles and involved at different levels.
So maybe you have a few categories. But they’re one off cash bonuses, generally
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speaking. You have to acknowledge their hard work after the fact, and before
other people forget and move on.
In Tom’s case, “It was additional 20, 30 hours a week. No days off. No scheduled
days off, absolutely none for that time.” Eugene added, “Emotionally it takes a huge toll
on the management team and to the extent that, they have to deliver hard messages as
well, there’s probably questioning of the right thing to do for the team and where there
was disagreement, when you have to suck it up that’s not necessarily an easy thing for
teams to do.”
Communication practices. Participants described many aspects of the
communication surrounding an M&A (see Table 10). Six participants emphasized that
the communication plan is critical for success and that the lack of such a plan can
undermine the entire effort. Tom commented on the aspects of communication that he
found helpful during his M&A:
The [company] created a way—a look and a feel to communicate with everybody.
They developed something called the leader’s kit. If there was something that
everybody needed to know at the same time, it was in the leader’s kit. It was
pushed to all leaders in a certain type of email, in a certain format. “Here is what
it is, here is how you need to communicate it.” So there is a bit of a cheat sheet.
Whatever it was, it could have been fairly administrative, it could be quite
substantive, it could be around office configuration, it could be around IT
changes, whatever needed to be communicated. It could be philosophical, it could
be quite tactical, anything that had an enterprise wide audience, big or small was
pushed to the leader kits. Some weeks, there were two and there might not be
anything for 2 or 3 weeks. But I would say there was, you know, in the early days
of the merger, probably four to six, to ten of them a month, one or two a week.
Amanda explained how lack of adequate communication undermined the M&A
that he experienced and how bringing in an effective communicator helped shift the
course of the endeavor:
There was also a lack of communication and change management. Later they
brought in someone new in [human resources] as the [senior vice president]—
someone who had an organizational change background. This was about 2 years
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in, and this person influenced the other senior executives and communicated the
culture, values and expectations, created a cultural mandate. It was really
interesting to see the effect of having someone in that role and thinking through
how it could’ve gone if they’d had that person to begin with.
Table 10
Communication Practices
Theme
Communication plan is critical for success
Nature of communication
Multimodal and repeated
Open and honest
Two-way communication with acquired employees
Convey a consistent message
Players
Executives and other leadership (3)
Communications specialist (3)
Content of communication
Rationale for change
Impact on individuals
Short- and long-term vision
Answers to questions and rumors
Timing
Pre-acquisition—no communication
Early acquisition
Initial pitch to acquired employees needs to occur early and involve influential
people from both organizations
Ongoing communication
N = 12
The participants also reported that communication about the M&A should be
multimodal and repeated (n = 5), be open and honest (n = 3), support two-way
communication with employees (n = 3), and present a consistent message (n = 2). In
Paul’s case, he explained,
they had a fulltime integration communication manager and [the company] does
that very well. They have a superb communications group and they made a big
commitment to communication. They had integration bulletins, they had
integration emails that were now, they had integration coffee meetings. I mean
they had a whole host of interventions that they scheduled and they had leader’s
notes available.

n
6
5
3
3
2
6

5
4
2
2
2
2
5
3
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In George’s experience,
we set up the communications office and had somebody lead that tied very closely
to the integration office to basically make sure we were very tightly, in a
coordinated way controlling the delivery of message to everybody, and used every
form of communication we could think of: all hands meetings, informal face to
face, chats, coffee sessions, email, whatever we could do to make the message
was delivered to employees. In the absence of fact, people make up their own
facts. . . . So we’ve always done [these kinds of communications during
acquisitions]. . . . It’s part of our practice, it’s something we consistently do.
Openness and honesty is also important, as Eugene explained,
We communicate. Again, it goes back to communicating what you know, and
identifying what you don’t know, so that people have a clear [idea of what is
going on]. The more information people have about what’s going to happen to
them, the better it is. . . . If you don’t know, don’t make it up. I think it just comes
back to a fundamental philosophy of being as genuine as you can in your
approach to business.. The more genuine you are, the more people see that. If
you’re trying to hide something from people, they’ll understand that too. People
are intuitive about, you know, especially if they know an acquisition is going on,
they’re going to be looking for what’s been hinted from above.
Paul shared how the M&As he was involved with allowed for two-way
communication with employees:
On the second day of our [3-day] conference, we all went to their headquarters
office where all the employees were. We shared what we had done and why we
had done what we had done to get their feedback. At the same time we posted all
that on a global, sort of, live website, where people could in real time go in and
respond to that.
Eugene emphasized the criticality of presenting a consistent message:
We spent an inordinate amount of time—actually, I would say we were one of the
few organizations that actually did it the right way in terms of really taking the
time to plan out the people part as far as they could go. So that when we did the
communications plan, we already had a road map as far as what was going to
happen with people, so you didn’t find yourself backtracking on key messages or
making statements that could be later pointed to as disingenuous or could start to
disrupt. So the consistency of message we spent a lot of time doing the pre-work
so that whatever we said at the beginning, to the extent that we could control it,
was aligned with the actions that we had to take all the way through.
The participants described multiple players being involved in the communication,
including executives and other leadership (n = 3), communications specialists (n = 3), and
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the integration manager (n = 1). Sam shared his experience regarding the artful
communication of one senior executive:
One of the things that I saw done very well was that, again, one of the senior
executives actually took time and effort to communicate with people here, to be
honest and transparent, and to do it with a bit of a sense of humour. So I’ll give
you an example. We had an employee forum. And we’d repositioned Calgary as
the head of research and technology, because that was now the major presence.
That’s great but it doesn’t help much when you don’t have a senior team.
Anyway, we kind of said ok, here’s our new identity, here’s what’s in it for us,
here’s where we want people to go. And of course, that worked for the people in
research, but not for the small core group. So he’s up there taking questions, and
I’ll always remember this: Somebody said to him. He read this question out loud,
and it said something to the effect of “I don’t believe a word you guys are saying,
you have no integrity, everything you say is bullshit” or something to that effect.
And he read it out loud, and then he said, well, I would respond to this, but you
couldn’t rely on it, it would be dishonest. But he got a laugh, and it took the tone
down. It was beautifully done.
For Eugene, communication was coordinated and managed by specialists: “human
resources and our corporate communications group to provide expertise around what’s
the right way to cascade communications to employees.” This approach also was cited by
Paul and George.
Several participants reported that the content of the communication should convey
the rationale for the change (n = 5), the impact on the individuals (n = 4), the short- and
long-term vision (n = 2), and answers to questions and rumors (n = 2). Chuck elaborated,
Well I think there’s probably a set of key messages that are going to go across
how you are communicating it right? So that’s going to include the strategic
rationales. It’s going to include usually painting the picture of why this is a good
move both for the target company’s customers, their employees. Also why it’s
going to benefit your company and so try to paint that picture; in my experience
when companies are in the process of selling themselves they ultimately do that
themselves. Then the reaction is, we’ve sold our company that’s great. Then what
you have to do is reorient them, to yes congratulations you are getting paid for a
successful sale. But it’s really the beginning of a journey that we have together.
So as an acquirer you really have to paint the picture of why there is a new
chapter in this employee’s career and this target company’s career. You need to
paint the picture why that’s a bright one, otherwise it’s almost like you have to rerecruit people who you’ve brought in to get them fired up. So that has to be
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woven through the messages too and so, the channels for these communications
range from offsite meetings to email messages that blast out to people. To
communicating directly with managers so they have the answers that they can
give to their employees. So there are multiple channels to these communications
that sort of that’s kind of the job of what you want to try to accomplish. It’s
painting the strategic rationale for the deal and explaining to people why it’s
going to be exciting for them to work at your company.
Eugene emphasized that in addition to understanding all these facets of the
change, employees are naturally going to be concerned about the bottom-line impact for
them. He emphasized the importance of spelling out the impacts for the individual:
So, initially we just with the acquisition it would be the communication that the
acquisition had happened, who is now in charge, so who’s the management,
what’s changed, what’s not going to change. People just really care, you know, as
much as it’s the bigger picture, you do a couple of bullets on that, but then you
really have to start answering the ‘what’s next for me’ question, or how does this
impact me. So there was always a high level communication at that point, and
then you break it down by department, so there were certainly the FAQs that had
to come at a corporate level or division level, and then for each department if
there were more specific actions that were going to happen, so for example
working with our COO on figuring out the timing of layoff waves. Certainly there
were departments that we did signal would have waves of layoffs. And we were
going to do it kind of as quickly and to the extent that we could as fairly and as
painlessly as possible. And we also clearly communicated when things would
start and when things would finish- it was important for people to know that when
the layoffs were done it was done. Yeah it doesn’t change. It doesn’t matter what
you communicate, you could communicate it six ways from Sunday, but really,
that’s what they care about. [what’s in it for me]. Yeah, there’s anxiety, there’s, I
mean, there’s enough anxiety in business day to day with bad economies, that
throw an acquisition on top of that and you can get complete inertia and
dysfunction.
Donna added that communication needs to continue for an extended period of time:
That can include ensuring the FAQ keeps going for a few months – you have to
assume that if two people are coming forward and questioning something, then
more will be. So we did FAQ weekly at first, then biweekly, then monthly until it
seemed like it made sense to stop. But we kept it going for a long time, to make
sure people knew who to contact, how to contact, what to do, how the systems
worked, etc. We kept it up all the way through.
Finally, participants discussed the timing of communication. Two participants
explained that typically no communication occurs during the pre-acquisition period due
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to legal and competitive concerns. Tom explained, “There were some very specific legal
requirements on what you could talk about or not. So the information that you could
share could not be competitive in anyway, etc.” Five participants explained that an initial
pitch to acquired employees is needed early in the acquisition and that this pitch needs to
involve influential people from both organizations. Bart described the excitement that
was generated by the personal involvement of the Chief Executive Officer of the
acquiring company:
Right after the acquisition email, the next day, we also got a [chief executive
officer] recording: a video of the two chief executive officers talking about how
excited they were, and that kind of stuff. And then we were told that the
[acquiring company’s chief executive officer] was going to come and visit us in
our offices before we move to their offices. So this is all happening within the
first week of the acquisition, right? And indeed the [chief executive officer] came,
and he was a very personable guy, and he knew a lot about the technology, to the
degree that he talked with every single person in their offices, in fact one by one.
. . . I was very impressed. I don’t know if he was prepped or not, but he knew my
background. He knew my PhD advisor, he knew the guys I work with, he actually
talked with me about 5-6 minutes about technical stuff . . . and he knew what the
hell he was talking about. That’s very impressive to see. I was very impressed. I
was actually quite excited. Here’s a guy who’s very well known in the oil
industry, and he knows his technical stuff as well. I mean, that’s generally a
concern for engineers, right? You want to work for someone who knows his
technical things, and he appears to be the guy. He’s very personable, He shows up
in a Hawaii shirt, jeans and a cowboy hat. It was very casual. It was done very,
very well.
In Tom’s experience,
It was a two day launch. . . . All those people were brought together in Calgary for
two full days, kind of a strategic launch of the organization. The company
strategy was reviewed, the 6 months, 12 months goals of the organization. They
sat tables of people that were mixed across functions and business areas in
different levels. They had an executive at most tables, that kind of thing. So just
through a series of presentations, all parts of the business leaders presenting in an
engaging way kind of the highlight, everybody got a sense of the whole business.
. . . It was all very well produced and communicated and very well done. So at the
end of that day, everybody I think had a sense of the whole business and at the
highest levels what kind of the strategy looked like, in a general sense then what
their business area or functional areas piece was of the puzzle. At least kind of
conceptually how it was going to fit in or hopefully fit in the organization.
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Three participants additionally stressed the importance of ongoing communication
throughout the endeavor.
Leadership support. Participants voiced several recommendations related to
leaders’ involvement and support of M&A activities (see Table 11). Seven participants
emphasized that leaders from both sides must demonstrate their engagement and
accountability related to the effort. George reflected,
If you don’t have a good healthy working relationship with your executive chief
from the other side, none of this works. You cultivate a very strong relationship
and that’s why your integration office is made up of people from both sides. It’s
clearly not [just the acquired company], so it’s a very shared, and [politically] it’s
an obligation to make sure these events are successful. That’s how we did it. But
that’s how it’s always done. You have to have engagement from both sides.
Table 11
Leadership Support
Theme
Leaders from both sides must demonstrate their engagement and accountability
Leaders need to provide clear direction, vision, and ongoing support
Need to involve competent, respected leaders
Lack of support can undermine engagement
N = 12

n
7
7
4
3

Seven participants also emphasized that the leaders need to provide clear
direction, vision, and ongoing support. In Paul’s view,
I would say [the biggest success factor is] the CEOs fundamental commitment to
building a robust, well-defined culture. We might not agree with the culture but
again in his mind it is safety first, customer service and financial success. He will
strive for financial success and he will make really tough really fast decisions, to
support financial success. So because he’s so clear everybody else is so clear.
There’s just no ambiguity and so then everything grows off with that, so they had
to develop a new compensation total rewards to support those values. So then all
of the human resources systems had to line up including performance
management, total compensation, all the investments and training to those core
values.
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Four participants emphasized the importance of including competent, respected
leaders in the effort. Chuck explained that although the executive leaders in the acquiring
company may have limited involvement in the M&A effort, it is essential to have the
willing involvement of executive and senior leaders from the acquired company. He
explained how their involvement helps build trust and engagement among the acquired
employees:
Having the senior leadership involved is essential because I think just logic will
tell you that when you are a part of a company being acquired, the first place you
look is to your leader and see what their reaction is. If their reaction is (a) “this is
a good thing for us” and explains their reasons [and] (b) “this is what we need to
do to make sure that our business can continue to thrive and succeed in the new
environment,” then you’re less anxious what I need you to do in that capacity.
The acquired leaders have all the trust built up. To have these messages coming
from the target management team are just critical.
Three participants additionally articulated that lack of leadership support can
undermine employees’ engagement. Bart explained that in his experience,
I know there was a little bit of a problem with not being able to fully integrate to
the [acquiring company’s] side and not really communicating, so a lot of people
were just frustrated. They’d have problems and previously they were able to talk
to the [chief executive officer] of [our start-up] or someone and have it resolved.
But here [post-acquisition], they were reporting to someone else, and that guy was
not really paying attention, or that kind of thing. So, there was that frustration
going on.
This can be further exacerbated when the leadership of the acquired company has
left or been terminated, as Amanda pointed out:
There was no advocacy, and people didn’t have an advocate in the organization.
Each person was left to talk to someone they knew and try and fend for
themselves. I found it disturbing that there was no objective leader. . . . My leader
opted to take the package and leave, like many others.
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Additional Findings
Participants shared several additional findings beyond the study focus regarding
general success factors for M&As, facilitators of engagement, and perceived causes of
failure for M&As.
Five participants stressed the importance of creating, communicating, and
remaining cognizant of shared goals (see Table 12). Three of these participants described
the importance of creating and communicating shared goals and outcomes. For example,
Walter explained how facilitating visioning exercises for acquired standalone
departments was empowering and engaging, thus, helping the acquired employees gain
some autonomy and feel better about being part of the new company:
So there was a publisher team and advertiser team. They would have team
meetings kind of ball up ideas as to what they wanted their team to represent.
They ended up voting on the vision statement and mission statement for the team
which kind of bubbled up into evolving like a vision and mission across the entire
department. . . . I do honestly think that the vision and mission exercises helped.
Because what came out of it was an organization that was very customer focused,
which was a way for then to have psychological [independence] from the rest of
[the acquiring company].
Table 12
Success Factors
Theme
Create, communicate, and remain cognizant of shared goals
Create and communicate shared goals and outcomes (3)
Keep the end goal in mind (3)
Move quickly
Use best practices and checklists with caution
Understand the business
Conducting postmortem reviews can enhance future M&As
N = 12
Three of these participants also stressed the need to keep the end goal in mind.
Donna explained,

n
5

2
1
1
1
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You have to keep the end goal in mind, right from due diligence, to ensure that
you’re supporting that end goal all the way through. People don’t want to focus
on what the structure will look like, all the details. They don’t want to talk about
that. You have to keep the end goal in mind and make sure that you’re aware of
how what you’re doing will factor into the business.
Two participants believed that it was important to move quickly during an M&A.
Donna explained that moving was quickly was necessary because M&As affect
employees’ emotions, sense of security, and even their livelihood. Moving quickly is part
of demonstrating respect for their need to know:
We made commitments to the employees to move quickly as soon as the deal was
announced. I maintain that you have to move quickly, even if moving quickly is at
the risk of making some mistakes. There’s no excuse for not dealing with a sense
of immediacy and urgency. You have to get it done quickly and stabilize things.
You’re dealing with people, dealing with their lives. It may not be perfect in the
way you do it, but it needs to be urgent.”
Particularly relevant to this study, Donna also emphasized that best practices and
checklists meant to guide M&As should be used with caution. She explained that
guidelines can be helpful if someone is new to acquisitions; however, the risk is that they
can cause M&A leaders to waste time on unnecessary steps:
On my first acquisition, we had management consultants and I learned from them.
They helped me to see things I wouldn’t have thought of. I had binders of
checklists. I went through them. Only, you get stuck on those and don’t remember
to pause. You spend time on things that don’t matter. Every situation’s different,
and they helped me a lot at first. Now, I don’t need them anymore, and I go with
my gut. I don’t think I even looked at a binder on [this latest] acquisition. It’s not
all about checklists, you have to adapt to the situation. Best practices don’t fit
every time. Sometimes I read those textbooks and get something from them, but
they can cause you to spend a lot of time on the things that don’t matter. You get
perspective from the people and you realize that one size doesn’t fit all. You have
to call on your wisdom.
Two additional success factors concerned the need to understand the business and
the value of conducting a postmortem review to capture lessons learned for the purpose
of enhancing future M&As.
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The participants identified four approaches for facilitating employees’
engagement during M&A efforts (see Table 13). Five participants pointed out that change
is difficult; therefore, it is important to allow for gradual change in acquired employees.
Our experience has been, people expect change. I think you have people on the
extremes who think nothing should change or nothing will change, I think that’s
not a realistic view. I think most people expect change. But change is hard for
everybody. Forget acquisitions—change is hard for you and me. Change is hard.
When you have a gradual transition, it allows them more of a mental time to
adjust and adapt to that change. I think the second thing it does, it shows them, it
allows them to see the additional things that they’re getting, instead of just
focusing on the things that they’re having to give up. So it becomes more of a
balanced decision making in their head. It becomes “yeah I’m having to do things
differently, but wow, look at the things that I didn’t have that are really cool”.
And so, in their minds, it’s not such a lopsided decision that change is bad, I have
to do everything differently. It’s about “wow, my life is a little bit simpler now”.
And so, there’s more balance in their thought process I think.
George added that it can a helpful technique for allowing gradual change is to create a
“bubble” environment for acquired company employees to ease their transition:
So while you can create kind of a bubble environment for them during the
integration period, and I think it’s helpful to do that, because you provide them a
smooth transition and a glide path.
He provided the example of when his company acquired a company with a very hightouch, helping-oriented culture into his company’s self-help culture:
What we tried to do, on [this] transaction was, for the 6-12 months post-close, we
tried to go against the norm of self-help, and actually be very, very high touch to
the acquired company, to make sure that their transition was smooth and there
wasn’t high frustration with the others. And also we really tried to help them
instead of just giving them the tools. Kind of like giving them the fish, versus
teaching them how to fish. And I think what happened, the result of the
acquisition and the response, the result of the integration was extremely positive. I
think people were very pleased with the outcome. But then as the integration team
whittled off, and they started getting mainstreamed, they started getting exposed
to that self-help environment, which caused a little bit of, I wouldn’t say pain, but
uneasiness. You know, “Hey, where’s all the TLC that I got?” So in hindsight, it
was still the right thing to do, because ultimately, what we created was a smooth
transition and a glide path to reality, and just completely exposing them 100% to
ours would have been a pretty significant shock.
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Table 13
Facilitators of Engagement
Theme
Allowing for gradual change in acquired employees
Exposing people from each side to the benefits unique to the other side
Joining with a brand-name leader or company
N = 12

n
5
4
2

Another general success factor that four participants cited for enhancing
engagement was to expose people from each side to the benefits unique to the other
side—that they will now gain through the M&A. Chuck explained,
You kind of re-recruit them. You have to win their hearts and minds. They have
to understand their strategic rationale for the deal: What their role of the new
organization is and how they are going to contribute to it and how to be excited
about that. If they are not, they’ll sit around, they’ll do deal and, the risk is, sit
around and do okay work. Then, [at some point] they decide, “Okay well I’ve
done my time here I’m moving on.” For some people, that’s going to happen, but
what you want to do is put some concerted effort to kind of re-recruit people to
energize them about the new strategy and what you are trying to do with the
business.
Two participants pointed out that joining with a brand name leader or company
also can be exciting for acquired employees. Walter shared,
But here on the other side these were a lot of recent college grads, there were a lot
of really young people like 25, 26 and younger that made up those teams. So they
were like, “Oh, [this company is acquiring us!] This is going to be awesome.”
They were excited about the brand name, they were excited about what getting
integrated into [our] products could offer to their customers.
Participants also identified several causes they believed contributed to M&A
failure (see Table 14). Although each specific cause was mentioned by one to three
participants, the perceived contributors to failure included strategic causes (n = 7), people
causes (n = 5), external causes (n = 3), and operational causes (n = 2).
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Table 14
Causes of Failure
Theme
Strategic causes
Having or setting up inaccurate expectations (3)
Lack of alignment and shared goals at executive level (2)
Lack of business strategy (2)
Subsuming rather than integrating the acquired company (2)
Strategic or customer orientation mismatch (2)
Insufficient resources (2)
People causes
Cultural inflexibility and power dynamics (2)
Industry attitudes toward employees (2)
Decision makers getting caught up in adrenaline of the deal (1)
Past bad experiences with acquiring company employees created negative
expectations (1)
Overuse of consultants who do not embed knowledge (1)
External causes (financial markets)
Operational causes
Technology integration not addressed (2)
Incongruous company age/technological maturity level (2)
N = 12

n
7

5

3
2

Strategic causes included having or setting up inaccurate expectations (n = 3),
lack of alignment and shared goals at executive level (n = 2), lack of business strategy (n
= 2), subsuming rather than integrating the acquired company (n = 2), having a
strategic/customer orientation mismatch between the companies (n = 2), and having
insufficient resources (n = 2). Bart described the early acquisition communications
approaches used in his M&A experience as setting expectations too high:
It wouldn’t have been a problem in my mind if we weren’t overpromised and
under-delivered. If that initial week wasn’t all full of promises and lots of
communication. That kind of sets the bar. You expect that level of communication
going forward, and we didn’t get that. That might have had some kind of effect as
well, because if the [chief executive officer] didn’t show up, for example, and
didn’t show personal attention and that kind of stuff in week 1, then why do I care
if I don’t see the [chief executive officer] again for 6, 7 months (which was the
case, by the way). So, if you set the expectations so high at the beginning, you’re
kind of setting yourself up for failure. Because it’s very hard to execute that level,
and indeed they couldn’t.

62
Bart additionally explained how the acquired company managers insulated his
company from the rest of the environment. Although the participant appreciated this,
these actions served to thwart integration and instead perpetuate a division between the
acquired and acquiring companies:
The [chief executive officer] of [my start-up], who became the [chief technology
officer at the acquiring company], actually did a pretty good job of isolating us
from all the problems that were happening so we could continue delivering new
versions of the software, and this is why we were able to continue delivering new
versions of the software on the original dates. So, you know, he tried to shield us
a little bit from some of the more nastier things. Like the sales commission issue I
mentioned, was communicated to me because I happened to be good friends with
the [vice president] of sales and that’s where I was getting my information. So,
there’s a little bit of that. He may have just seen the integration manager not doing
his job properly and may have told him to stop talking to us just because it was
making things worse. I’m speculating here, but I would believe it.
People-oriented causes of failure identified by the participants include cultural
inflexibility and power dynamics (n = 2), industry attitudes toward employees (n = 2),
decision makers getting caught up in adrenaline of the deal (n = 1), past bad experiences
with acquiring company employees created negative expectations (n = 1), and overuse of
consultants who do not embed knowledge (n = 1). Amanda explained how in the M&A
she experienced, one company’s employees feel like their voice was not heard and their
culture was not reflected in the resulting corporation. She explained,
The [chief executive officer] used a lot of consultants, who’d been with the team
for a lengthy time. The consultants conducted sessions on culture, but because the
power dynamics were shifting to the Company T side, employees from Company
K felt like it was predetermined and they were unheard. They felt like the culture
was non-negotiable from the time they started.
Amanda further noted that the petroleum industry tends to perpetuate ideas that
employees are less valuable than the material resources, which serves to diminish
engagement. Fortunately, in this case, leadership within human resources helped restore
an employee focus:
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Pipelines are a very expensive asset and don’t need a lot of people to run. Thus,
people are almost incidental to the business a lot of the time. This was the
approach the leadership took, to the detriment of the combination. The new
[human resources senior vice president] turned that around and helped the
company to focus on its people, leadership and employee development.
Three participants also shared that external causes—primarily the financial
market downturns—derailed the success of the M&A. Bart explained how the market
downturn caused the acquired company’s initial public offering to be deferred, thus,
eliminating any potential financial benefits of the acquisition that acquired employees
had anticipated:
When we got acquired, at the time, [the acquiring company] had plans to go for
an [initial public offering]. [Deferring the initial public offering] basically means
that when the acquisition happened, there was no money exchanged. People
essentially switched their [start-up company] stock for [the acquiring company’s]
stock. And then the financial crisis happened and the [initial public offering]
never materialized. Because of that, all the stock options that we held were just a
piece of paper, they weren’t worth anything. I know that there were a bunch of
people that left, because they actually had a lot of stock but they came to realize
that it’s not gonna be worth anything, its not gonna get a payout. Typical of a
start-up environment, the base salaries were low, but you had a lot of stock, and if
the stock is worthless, then you may as well get out, get a job with the next big
company. So that was another driver, and we lost a few good guys that way.
The final cause of failure, identified by two participants, concerned operational
causes. This included the failure to address technology integration and having
incongruencies between company age and technological maturity level between the
acquired and the acquiring company. Bart shared that in his acquisition experience,
I’m not even sure there was any due diligence done ahead of time to see if the
technologies could be integrated easily. By the time I left, we weren’t even
sharing any kind of documentation, wikipages, anything like that. We could go
and look at their pages, they could look at our pages, and that kind of stuff, but
they were completely disjoined from each other, you would need separate
accounts, there were all kinds of IT issues, that sort of stuff. . . . On the
engineering side, we had all kinds of problems there. The main issue we had was
that technologies being used were very different. From the get go we could tell
there was no plans to integrate, technology wise. We just put in a rule and said we
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need to figure out something. . . . Um, so that created quite a bit of problems as
well.
Summary
This chapter reported the results of the study. First, a rich description of each
participant was provided to help contextualize the results. Twelve participants were
interviewed for this study. Participants’ M&A experienced generally involved one or two
efforts, although some had extensive M&A experience. Their M&A experience spanned
the Petroleum, Internet Information, Mobile Communications, Plastics, Publishing, Real
Estate, and Software industries. Few participants reported the use of an integration
manager, cultural due diligence, or cultural integration. Eighteen of the 21 projects
described utilized an integration team. Roughly half of the efforts resulted in positive
organizational outcomes, although only four efforts were reported to yield positive people
outcomes, and only two were perceived to result in satisfactory integration of the
companies involved in the effort.
Second, participants’ views regarding the dynamics of M&As were presented.
Participants shared that the acquiring company tends to have more decision-making
power than the acquired company, and that the long process of an M&A is typically
organized in three phases: due diligence, planning, and driving the integration.
Third, participants’ evaluation of the M&A success factors examined in the
present research were reported. A summary of these results are as follows:
1. Cultural due diligence. Although the participants emphasized that cultural
similarity promotes M&A success and mismatch can lead to M&A failure,
none of the participants stated that cultural due diligence was necessary.
2. Cultural integration: Participants viewed cultural integration as focusing on
making retention, severance, retirement decisions and providing information
and reassurance to managers and employees about their job security. This
phase also can include assessing the culture and creating a culture integration
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plan. They pointed out the importance of involving human resources in this
endeavor and keeping in mind both the organization’s present and future
needs during this process. Two participants additionally believed that lack of
cultural integration can lead to M&A failure.
3. Integration planning: Half the participants stated it was important to create a
thorough but adaptable plan. Three participants additionally emphasized that
the plan must be customized to the situation and culture.
4. Integration managers and teams: Only two participants noted that integration
managers were essential for success. They offered several guidelines
concerning the integration teams, such as the need for pairing team members
one-to-one with an integration partner on the other side, forming crossfunctional and cross-organizational teams, allowing team members to be fully
dedicated to the effort and carefully outlining roles and responsibilities, and
giving team members special rewards and recognition.
5. Communication: Half the participants emphasized that a communication plan
is critical for success. Participants explained that communication about the
M&A should be multimodal and repeated, open and honest, two-way
communication with acquired employees, and consistently messaged.
Executives, other leaders, and communications specialist were reported to
play important roles in communication. According to participants, the
communication specifically should outline the rationale for change, the impact
on individuals, short- and long-term vision for the M&A, and answers to
questions and rumors. Communication during the early phases of the
acquisition is particularly important for engaging affected employees.
6. Leadership support: More than half the participants emphasized that leaders
from both sides must demonstrate their engagement and accountability to the
M&A. They also stressed the importance of providing clear direction, vision,
and ongoing support. Moreover, competent and respected leaders need to be
involved in these activities. Participants cautioned that any lack of leadership
support can undermine engagement.
Fourth, additional unanticipated findings emerging from the data were presented.
Five participants expressed the importance of creating, communicating, and remaining
cognizant of shared goals. Two participants also pointed out the need to move quickly
because M&As disrupt people’s lives. One participant also believed that best practices
and checklists for M&As should be used with caution. Participants also identified three
specific facilitators of engagement during M&As: allowing for gradual change in
acquired employees, exposing people from each side to the benefits unique to the other
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side, and joining with a brand-name leader or company. Finally, participants believed that
M&A failures stem from four types of causes: strategic causes, people causes, external
causes, and operational causes. The next chapter provides a discussion of these results.
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Chapter 5
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to explore the use of M&A people-integration best
practices in the private sector. Analysis of past literature pointed to six integration best
practices concerning cultural due diligence, cultural integration, integration planning,
integration managers and teams, communication practices, and leadership support. Data
were collected from managers in successful M&As to understand their use of these best
practices. This chapter presents a discussion of the results, including conclusions,
recommendations, implications for organization development practitioners, limitations,
and suggestions for continued research.
Conclusions
The following sections examine and discuss the preliminary findings related to
the six emerging M&A best practices that were the focus of the present study. A
discussion of the study’s additional findings also is presented.
Cultural due diligence. Despite the importance of cultural similarity among
M&A partner organizations, none of the participants stated that cultural due diligence
was necessary. Moreover, few participants reported the use of cultural due diligence
during their own M&As. These results are consistent with Harding and Rouse (2007),
who stated that due diligence is traditionally focused on financial and strategic market
factors in an M&A, and cultural due diligence is often non-existent or done in a cursory
manner. Participants explained that the M&As were going to happen regardless of
cultural fit or issues; therefore, cultural due diligence would have been ineffectual at best
and a waste of time and resources at worst.
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These findings suggest that despite its being advocated as a best practice, in the
cases discussed in this study, cultural due diligence was not a routine part of M&A
efforts. The body of literature (Datta, 1991; Papadakis, 2007; Weber, 1996) emphasized
the criticality of cultural due diligence, which could explain the generally poor people
outcomes the participants reported for their M&As. Given the need for cultural
evaluation but the futility of it as a decision making exercise, as described by this study’s
participants, it may be advisable to forgo the idea of cultural due diligence and instead
ensure that cultural exploration was performed immediately upon completion of the due
diligence phase. As recommended by participants, cultural exploration could endeavor to
identify the primary areas of friction that may occur when the companies are combined.
This recommendation is discussed further in the Recommendations section in this
chapter.
Cultural integration. Few participants in this study reported cultural integration
as an activity in their own M&As. Nevertheless, they still advised undertaking several
cultural integration activities, such as making personnel decisions, providing information
and reassurance to employees, assessing culture, and creating a culture integration plan.
According to participants, human resources play a central role in these activities.
In a review of the sample used in this study, there was an emphasis on the
importance of a cultural integration for M&A success. Furthermore, the initial findings of
this study suggest that M&As are emotionally charged endeavors: in the face of the
ambiguity of an M&A, affected leaders and employees alike tend to feel anxious,
worried, and uncertain about their future. As a result, it is important for the individuals
leading the M&A to provide emotional support to employees through information,
reassurance, and coaching. Of course, these emotionally supportive activities also must
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be balanced with the business needs. This sample is aligned with the literature (e.g.,
Ashkenas & Francis, 2000; Kay & Shelton, 2000; Papadakis, 2005), suggesting that
cultural integration is an important practice that may be being overlooked by
practitioners. A controlled study of different types of M&A integrations with a larger
sample size then the present analysis could further explore this finding and consider the
implications for practitioners.
Integration planning. Participants emphasized the importance of thorough, yet
adaptable planning. Rather than blindly applying best practices or checklist, participants
also emphasized that the plan must be customized to the situation and culture. These
findings suggest that for the M&A in this study, integration involved a range of complex
and interrelated activities that occur over an extended period of time. In Donna’s words,
“You gotta go for the details like you wouldn’t believe. You have to come out ready. . . .
Every detail [needs to be] planned [in advance].” These results are consistent with the
literature, which stated that integration needs to occur as early as possible and address all
the details of the integration (Ashkenas et al., 1998; Schweiger et al., 1993; Papadakis,
2007). Participants in this study suggested that for the potential for M&A success to be
maximized, it is necessary to have a guiding plan or charter that helps those involved in
the M&A to anticipate the steps and challenges ahead and to design their activities
accordingly. Moreover, according to participant accounts, much of this work occurs even
before the M&A is announced. These early-stage findings suggest that, when the two
companies plan to integrate, key individuals should be identified and selected in the early
stages from across functions from both organizations in order to create a comprehensive
and sufficiently detailed plan. Further research could examine the circumstances under

70
which this type of cross-functional cross-company team has the most impact on the
success of the M&A work.
Integration managers and teams. Few participants cited use of an integration
manager and even fewer cited them as an ingredient for success. In contrast, past
literature did assert that this role was critical (Ashkenas & Francis, 2000; Ashkenas et al.,
1998; Shelton et al., 2003). It is possible that use of an integration manager is an earlystage best practice; hence, this role is not yet widely used. Alternately, it is possible that
integration managers are playing active roles in M&As but carrying a different position
title: for example, some participants described their chief executive officer as being the
driver of the integration and the executives as being the team members. Yet another
explanation is that the role of integration manager may be helpful in theory but not
practical due to the complex and all-consuming nature of M&As. It may be impractical to
believe that one person could effectively oversee and manage these types of efforts. The
use and dynamics of the integration manager role in practice needs to be examined
further due to the discrepancy between past literature and the present study’s results. In
particular, it is important to examine whether this role is being carried out, if the role is
needed, and what the costs and benefits of the role are.
In contrast, the participants did frequently cite the use of integration teams and the
offered several suggestions for their use. Similarly, Marks and Mirvis (2000, 2011)
asserted that integration teams served a critical purpose in M&As. Participants in the
present study emphasized that the teams need to be cross-functional and crossorganizational, meaning that key members from each organization need to be paired with
their counterparts from the other organization. They emphasized that, in their opinions,
this type of team composition is necessary to create the integration plan that is critical to
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M&A success. They added that the important and all-consuming nature of integration
planning and execution means that team members should be able to be fully dedicated to
the effort and their often long and painstaking work should be recognized through special
rewards and recognition. It would be beneficial to further examine best practices
regarding integration teams, such as what size of team is needed and when the team
members must be fully dedicated to the effort. It is possible that the answers to these
questions are found in the size, nature, and complexity of the M&A. However, further
research is needed to reach definitive answers to these questions.
Communication. Several findings were generated on the topic of
communication, as participants emphasized the importance of a communication plan to
M&A success. This is consistent with the literature, as communication may be one of the
most commonly cited best practices for M&As (Kay & Shelton, 2000; Larsson &
Finklestein, 1999; Schweiger et al., 1987; Seo & Hill, 2005). In particular, participants in
the present study stressed that executives, other leaders, and communications specialists
need to communicate to and with acquired employees and that the communications
should be multimodal, repeated, open, honest, and consistent. Specifically, according to
participants, the communication specifically should outline the rationale for change, the
impact on individuals, short- and long-term vision for the M&A, and answers to
questions and rumors. Communication during the early phases of the acquisition is
particularly important for engaging affected employees. These findings underscore the
importance of communicating about the M&A. It follows that it is important to know
ahead of time what messages need to be conveyed to “sell” the organization and energize
employees about the new environment. Participants described it as being helpful when
leaders of the M&A made themselves available to answer questions. In short, effective
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communication appears to be a critical component of successful M&As. With a larger
sample size and specific types of M&A, further study could correlate the type, frequency,
style and level of communication that is most effective in assisting a positive M&A
outcome.
Leadership support. Participants emphasized that competent, trusted, and
respected leaders from both sides must demonstrate their engagement and accountability
to the M&A. They described situations where the integration, the effort overall, and
engagement and retention suffered as a result of leaders leaving, insulating their
employees, or failing to demonstrate their active support of the M&A. It is particularly
important for leaders to provide clear direction, vision, and ongoing support to employees
regarding the integration effort. These findings indicate that leaders can play a primary
role in assuring the success of the effort. This was consistent with the past literature,
which also outlined the many roles top management plays in leading, supporting, and
helping to institutionalize the change (Kotter, 2007; Marks, 1999; Morgan & Zeffane,
2003; Papadakis, 2007; Sackmann et al., 2009; Schein, 1985, 1990). Importantly,
participants also indicated that for leaders to demonstrate support for the effort, they too
need to feel supported. They can feel uneasy and uncertain during an M&A and it is the
responsibility of human resources and other leaders associated with the M&A to guide
leaders in their role and to provide the emotional and practical reassurance they need.
Additional findings. Participants offered several other insights that were not
anticipated in the original design. They emphasized the need to move quickly regarding
retention, severance, and retirement decisions after the initial announcement of the M&A
because these efforts disrupt peoples’ sense of job security. Once the integration is
underway, however, it can be helpful to allow employees to experience gradual change—
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sometimes by creating a “bubble” environment for them that slows introduces and
transitions them in to the acquiring company’s culture. Throughout the effort, participants
articulated that they felt that employee engagement can be bolstered by clearly
communicating shared goals and articulating the benefits of the M&A for employees.
Finally, it is helpful to anticipate and avoid the strategic, people, external, and operational
causes of failure to the extent possible. These findings could potentially represent
additional best practices that could be incorporated to an organization’s approach to
M&A efforts. Moreover, it would be helpful to investigate each of these in more detail, as
they were not a primary focus of the study and thus need to be validated and extended
through further research.
Recommendations
This study provided an exploratory look at the degree to which the identified
people-integration best practices in M&A are being utilized by practitioners. Therefore,
the following recommendations are built upon the idea that through this study’s
subjective, ethnographic research design, some themes have emerged that may be helpful
for OD practitioners in the field of M&A. The following recommendations are provided
as considerations for M&A integration practitioners, with the recognition that further
research is required to validate the preliminary findings of this study and determine to
what extent each of the themes outlined herein are applicable to the type of M&A being
conducted.
The first recommendation is to perform a cultural exploration immediately upon
completion of the due diligence phase. The study findings suggested that despite the
importance and influence of culture on M&A efforts, cultural incongruence does not
influence the decision whether to move forward with an M&A. Therefore, it appears
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important to perform a cultural exploration in the early stages of the M&A to learn about
the similarities and differences between the combining companies and consider how to
best work together in the context of the M&A. As suggested by Bob, this exploration
could use questions such as:
How do they make decisions to communicate things? How much autonomy do
managers have? Are they a founder-based company, do they have a lot of
allegiance to their founder or some more mature professionally run company?
How do they incent their sales force, is it highly leveraged? Do people get a really
low base salary but they could do really well if they sell a lot? Are they a more
flat structure, are they collaborative in their decision-making or is it pretty
dictatorial? Is it pretty top to down? Managers do they have one-way
communication with all their managers or most of their managers have staff
meetings? One on ones with their people or is it just sorted out as we go? Is
management excellence important to this company and are people compensated or
evaluated based on that?” So these are all they just kind of are on the top of my
head but, all of those things combined contribute to what in my mind is culture. I
find that it’s a lot easier to talk about the pieces of culture, than it is to talk about
culture itself.
There are several assessment tools available to assist in conducting this type of
cultural exploration. Examples include the Denison Organization Culture Survey, the
Organizational Culture Assessment Index, or the McKinsey Organizational Health Index.
Moreover, any checklist or cultural exploration methodology needs to be relatively
straightforward, understandable, and easy to analyze and interpret so that the results can
be reached and applied in a timely fashion. It follows that any cultural exploration
activity needs to lead directly into a thorough cultural integration effort to ameliorate
distressing ambiguity and cultural inconsistencies as rapidly and to the extent possible.
Five of the best practices examined in the literature were supported by the present
research as being potential components of M&A success. These include conducting
cultural integration, integration planning, using an integration team, having and executing
a communication plan, and demonstrating leadership support. It follows that practitioners
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should consider incorporating these practices into their M&A efforts. Several detailed
recommendations for their use can be found in the literature reviewed for this study, the
present study’s findings, and the study conclusions.
The findings of this study indicated that leader support was important for
promoting the success of an M&A effort. However, simply knowing this is important or
telling leaders that they need to support the effort may not be enough for them to proceed
to demonstrate their support. Instead, leaders often need to be held accountable for
supporting the effort. One potential way for this to be accomplished is by linking their
support to their performance evaluation and compensation. For example, leaders could be
taught to actively engage with and sponsor the merger amongst their colleagues and
direct reports, evaluated on their effectiveness in this regard, and be provided incentive
compensation appropriate to their performance.
Participants offered several insights and suggestions beyond the best practices that
were examined in the present study. These insights included tips about moving quickly,
yet allowing employees time to transition; being clear about goals; illustrating the
benefits of the M&A; and avoiding common causes of failure by ensuring expectations
are set appropriately, the business strategy is communicated, the value add of the
acquired company is recognized and the company is not simply subsumed by the
acquirer, the consultants embed their knowledge in the organization and that the company
remains flexible and open to the new employees and their company culture. Each of these
insights needs further investigation by researchers, but has face validity and may be
important an implementable in organizations. Organizational leaders and integration
teams should review these recommendations and may wish to build these into their
approaches.
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Implications for Organization Development Practitioners
Organization development practitioners often may be called upon to help
shepherd an M&A effort to success. The present study has provided an ethnographic
examination of M&A best practices advocated in the literature. With recognition that the
sample size and subjective nature of the study limits its generalizability, this study
suggests that actual practice of M&A people-integration work in some cases supports the
literature and in other cases there are gaps between the literature and practice. Further
research is needed to look at why this gap exists and provide further validation on the
themes proposed herein.
What is evident from the results of this study is that despite the sometimes
singular focus on financials and organization performance during the due diligence and
integration phases of an M&A, the actual experience appears to be a very human one.
Organization development practitioners have a particular expertise in the human side of
business and, as such, may need to strongly advocate for the cultural and emotional
aspects of the effort. This means working with organizational leaders and integration
teams to underscore the importance of balancing business and people. For example,
ensuring that timely communication and rapid movement are balanced with gradual
change, communicating to the point of seemingly over-communicating, or reminding the
integration team that “everyone’s nervous,” in the words of one participant. Overall, the
organization development practitioner can help the acquisition team in planning the
integration with consideration of the human impact. Practitioners can be aided in this
effort by familiarizing themselves with the M&A best practices examined in the present
study.
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Limitations
A primary limitation that affected this study was the difficulty in finding
participants who have experience managing the people aspect of M&A integrations. This
meant that participants in this study had varied levels of experience and knowledge
surrounding the strategic priorities or goals of their specific merger or acquisition, on
how decisions were made in the acquiring company, and on the processes that were
followed through the course of the integration. Therefore, it was not always possible to
uncover whether the best practices were followed and the rationale for the actions taken.
Moreover, it was not possible to gauge the accuracy of the participants’ views about the
M&A. If this study were to be repeated, the researcher would need access to a greater
pool of integration managers who were the key decision makers throughout the
integration process, who could describe the reasoning behind their decisions and actions.
Another limitation of this study is that best practices in M&A are difficult to
distill and quantify in a generalized sense, as there are many possible types of
acquisitions, and each one may require a different type of integration. For example, one
participant described an intellectual property focused acquisition, which had very few
people implications. Therefore, many of the best practices did not apply in that case. In a
similar vein, combination practices in mergers of roughly equally sized companies are
not necessarily comparable to combination practices in acquisitions by global companies
of small, localized companies. Many similar considerations will arise, but the practice of
integration, the timelines associated with it, the size and scope of the role of the
integration and leadership teams, and the impact upheaval caused to the organization’s
general population will vary based on the particular conditions of the M&A in question.
This affects the results of this study as the same factor that is cited as a necessity by one
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successful combination (e.g., the need for company-wide, repetitive and mixed-style
communication) could be cited as completely irrelevant by another. It would be
beneficial in future studies to examine one specific style of M&A at a time to determine
what works best for an effort of that type.
A third limitation of this study concerned the failure of recording devices for two
interviews. This required the researcher to rely on a combination of transcripts and notes
for data analysis. Researcher bias was more likely to have an effect on the results when
interview notes were used, as the researcher had to rely on her own memory and
shorthand to analyze the interview. The researcher summarized her notes as soon as
possible after the interview in cases where the recording failed; however, in these cases, it
was not possible to fully capture the participants’ thoughts in their own words. In future
studies, it is important to use a primary and a backup recording device in the event of
failure of the original. Additionally, it is critical to test the device before beginning the
interview.
This study utilized a qualitative design and gathered data using semi-structured
interviews. Despite the flexibility this allowed, the questions that were planned were not
always relevant for the participants. Moreover, the design allowed participants to provide
broad answers for anywhere from one to 55 experiences. Given the unique and complex
nature of M&As, this approach inadvertently resulted in an inconsistent set of data from
each participant. In some cases, a rather complete and detailed account was gathered,
whereas for other participants, specific data were lacking (e.g., whether the project
utilized an integration manager or conducted a formal process of cultural integration). In
future studies, it would be beneficial to have an interview script that is tailored to the
specific population and specific type of M&A being examined.
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Suggestions for Continued Research
The current research study provided a limited look at six emergent best practices
for M&A integration efforts. Some of the previous literature was supported in the
subjective analysis of this study, while other proposed best practices were not being
utilized or considered to be important by the participants in this study. This study was
intended to be exploratory in its look at M&A integration practices, and as such did not
attempt to distinguish between different types or sizes of M&A activity. Further research
using a larger sample size and a controlled methodology could confirm whether the
themes of this research are valid amongst different styles and sizes of M&A integrations,
and to what extent each of the themes proposed herein matters to the success of that
integration.
Participants offered several best practices that fell beyond the focus of the present
study. These includes practices such as moving quickly; allowing for gradual change;
clearly communicating shared goals; articulating the benefits of the M&A; and avoiding
the strategic, people, external, and operational causes of failure. It would be helpful to
investigate each of these in more detail, as they were not a primary focus of the study
and, thus, need to be validated and extended through further research.
External factors can influence success in the time period it takes for integration to
complete. For example, multiple participants cited the effect of recession, unemployment
rates or commodity prices as affecting the outcome of the merger or acquisition. All of
these factors are beyond the control of the integration team. Even the best-run integration
can fail to foresee and overcome external market factors. Conversely, an upswing in the
market may create financial success for an M&A even if it is poorly managed. Further
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study of M&A best practices should take into account and control for such external
factors.
In business, M&As are usually labeled as successful when they have met their
financial or strategic objectives. However, participants in this study would often qualify
financial success by stating whether it was also a success on the people front. The two are
interrelated but not one and the same, and the impact of poor people practices could
potentially affect the company for a much longer period then the short-term financial
results reflect. People integration practices may impact engagement, in turn reflected in
turnover rate. If the key people leave, the business may well run smoothly for a period
based on current state, but the loss of people with core knowledge or organization history
can have a lasting impact. Unfortunately, the effect of integration practices on financial
results can be difficult to ascertain, as a variety of factors impact the organization. Further
study could tie employee engagement surveys, a common measure of employee
happiness in an organization, to the integration practices used, including a measure of
whether the best practices outlined in this study had any overall effect on employee
engagement.
Summary
The purpose of this study was to identify people-integration best practices during
M&As and examine their use in the private sector. Analysis of past literature pointed to
six integration best practices concerning cultural due diligence, cultural integration,
integration planning, integration managers and teams, communication practices, and
leadership support. This study utilized a qualitative research interviewing design to gather
data from 12 individuals who played key roles in an M&A. The study findings supported
use of all the best practices with the exception of cultural due diligence and use of an
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integration manager. Additionally, participants emphasized the importance of moving
quickly; allowing for gradual change; clearly communicating shared goals; articulating
the benefits of the M&A; and avoiding the strategic, people, external, and operational
causes of failure.
Despite limitations concerning participant selection and data collection, several
recommendations emerged from this study, including performing a cultural exploration
immediately upon completion of the due diligence phase, implementing the best practices
that were validated by the study, holding leaders accountable for supporting the M&A
effort, and incorporating the participants’ additional suggestions. Recommendations for
continued research include further validation of whether the best practices outlined in the
literature and emergent themes from this study are being utilized successful in M&A
practices, examining the impact of external factors on M&A success and improving
measures of the people impact on M&A success. Ultimately, given the human
implications of M&As, organization development practitioners must lead the charge in
planning the integration with consideration of the human impact. Practitioners can be
aided in this effort by familiarizing themselves with the M&A best practices examined
and validated in the present study.
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Appendix A: Cover Letter
Dear Potential Participant,
As you know, integrating a new acquisition into an existing parent company is not an easy task. A
great deal of research has been conducted into how to conduct a successful acquisition, and yet,
most acquisitions fail to meet their stated financial or strategic goals. This failure can often be
traced to a lack of focus on the people-integration processes, resulting in what Marks and Mirvis
(1985) have termed “Merger Syndrome.” However, your organization defied the odds and
recently completed a successful acquisition, and I’m interested in understanding how you
achieved that.
As a student in Pepperdine University’s Master of Science in Organization Development, I am
seeking your participation in an important research project. The purpose of the study is to
determine what integration practices work in real-life business settings, and compare these to the
best practices outlined in the literature to understand what works in integrating acquisitions.
Knowledge gained from this study will be useful to look at the link between theory and successful
practices used in integrating acquired organizations.
Participation requires that you are available for a one-on-one in person or telephone interview to
discuss your organization’s recent acquisition, the stated goals of the acquisition, and how you
achieved these. Any question may be left unanswered if you wish. Participation is voluntary, and
you may withdraw from the study at any time without question or penalty.
All responses will be kept confidential. Only aggregate data will be reported in the thesis or in
any subsequent analysis beyond the thesis and possible future publication of the results.
Questionnaire and interview data will be stored securely in the researcher’s password-protected
computer files and/or locked file cabinet for five (5) years, after which all of it will be destroyed.
You have the right to ask, and have answered, any questions you may have about this research. If
you have questions, complaints, or concerns, you should contact the researcher, Suzanne, at
[contact information], or her supervisor, Gary Mangiofico, Ph.D., at [contact information].
All research on human volunteers is reviewed by a committee that works to protect your rights
and welfare. If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research subject, or if you
would like to obtain information or offer input, you may contact the Institutional Review Board at
Pepperdine University at [contact information].
Thank you for your consideration and participation,
Suzanne Dickinson
Candidate, Master of Science in Organization Development
Pepperdine University
Graziadio School of Business and Management
24255 Pacific Coast Highway
Malibu, CA 90263
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Appendix B: Informed Consent Form

Understanding of the Purpose of the Study and Informed Consent
Participant: _______________________________________________
Principal Investigator:
Title of Project:
Organizations

Suzanne Dickinson

Application of Best Practices in Integrating Acquired

1. I _______________________________, agree to participate in the research study
being conducted by Suzanne Dickinson, a student in the Master of Science in
Organization Development program at Pepperdine University, Graziadio School
of Business and Management, under the direction of Dr. Gary Mangiofico.
2. The overall purpose of this study is to determine whether the best practices
identified in theoretical literature surrounding acquisitions are in line with the
practices used by integration managers in organizations as they integrate an
acquired organization. Despite the existence of a large body of research
surrounding M&A, the majority of acquisitions fail to meet their stated aims, and
research indicates that many of these failures are due to failed integrations. Thus,
this study aims to determine what successful acquirers are actually doing as they
integrate the new organization, and whether these practices mirror the theoretical
best practices posited by the research. Key managers in recent successful
acquisitions are invited to participate in this study.
3. My participation will involve a 60 to 90 minute interview, which will be
conducted face-to-face in a mutually agreeable location, or on the phone. I grant
permission for the interview to be tape recorded and transcribed, and to be used
only by Suzanne Dickinson for analysis of interview data. I understand my
responses will be kept anonymous and confidential. If the findings of the study
are presented to professional audiences or published, no information that
identifies me personally or the organization(s) involved in the acquisition will be
released. The data will be kept in a secure manner for five (5) years, at which time
the data will be destroyed.
4. I understand there are no direct benefits to me for participating in the study. This
is an opportunity to give input about my experiences in integrating an acquisition,
and to contribute to the research surrounding best practices for acquiring
organizations.
5. I understand there are no major risks associated with this study.
6. I understand that I may choose not to participate in this research.
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7. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I may refuse to participate
and/or withdraw my consent and discontinue participation in the interview at any
time without penalty or loss of benefits to which I am otherwise entitled.
8. I understand that I may request a brief summary of the study findings to be
delivered in about one (1) year. If I am interested in receiving the summary, I will
send an email request to [contact information].
9. I understand that the researcher, Suzanne Dickinson, will take all reasonable
measures to protect the confidentiality of my records and my identity will not be
revealed in any publication that may result from this project. The confidentiality
of my records will be maintained in accordance with applicable state and federal
laws.
10. I understand that the investigator is willing to answer any inquiries I may have
concerning the research herein described and that I may contact the researcher,
Suzanne Dickinson, at [contact information]. I understand that I may contact Dr.
Gary Mangiofico at [contact information] if I have other questions or concerns
about this research. If I have questions about my rights as a research participant, I
understand that I can contact Dr. Doug Leigh, Chairperson of the Institutional
Review Board, Pepperdine University, at [contact information].
11. I understand to my satisfaction the information regarding participation in the
research project. All my questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I have
received a copy of this informed consent form, which I have read and understand.
I hereby consent to participate in the research described above.

____________________________________ _________________
Participant Signature
Date

____________________________________
Participant Name

I have explained and defined in detail the research procedure in which the subject has
consented to participate. Having explained this and answered any questions, I am
cosigning this form and accepting this person’s consent.
____________________________________ __________________
Suzanne Dickinson
Date
Principal Investigator
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Appendix C: Interview Guide

Opening remarks:
Welcome and statements regarding the purpose of the study, interview timeline, openness
of the discussion, privacy of information, and ethical issues.
Introductory question:
• Can you tell me about your experience in integrating acquisitions?
Key questions and prompts:
• In your role as the lead on your company’s integration, what was the mandate you
had? What kind of approach did you take to integrating the two companies?
• Were you working with a team? If so, what was the composition of the team?
• At what stage did you get involved in the acquisition (e.g. due diligence, preintegration, post-integration)?
• What were the stated goals of the acquisition from the standpoint of the acquiring
company?
o What were the expected outcomes of the acquisition—what were you
hoping to achieve through the acquisition?
o How does the acquisition fit into the greater strategy of your
organization?
o How was this communicated to employee on both sides?
• In your opinion, were those goals reached?
o Why/ why not?
o What was your role in helping achieve those goals?
o What kinds of processes were used to achieve the goals of the acquisition?
• What were the performance measures in place to determine the value of the
purchased firm?
o What was defined as good performance as versus weak performance in
meeting the goals and targets for value?
• What roles did your company’s senior management team play in the acquisition
and integration?
o Were they a part of or separate to the integration team?
o How involved were they throughout the process?
o What type of support did they provide/ feedback did they ask for?
o Who was accountable for the success or failure of the acquisition?
• What were the top criteria for finding an acquisition target?
o How high on the list was cultural fit of the targeted firm?
• Was cultural due diligence a part of the target company identification process or
overall due diligence process?
o Why/why not?
o What was the usefulness of this in the integration planning process?
• Can you tell me more about the acquisition integration?
o At what stage of the acquisition process did integration planning begin?
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•

•

•

•

•

o Was there a plan in place for ensuring the integration went smoothly and
met specific milestones?
o What went well? How/why?
o What could be improved? How/why?
How did you communicate with employees of the newly acquired firm and in the
acquiring firm?
o How effective was this communication style?
o When were the employees of the acquired firm notified of the acquisition,
and in your opinion, did this have any effect on the acquisition?
How did you ensure retention of key talent on both sides of the acquisition?
o How did you determine the roles and new positions of the current
management team, and identify and communicate with key talent
throughout the organization?
o What was the retention rate of key talent?
Would you describe the workforce as engaged and committed?
o How long did this take to achieve?
o What particular practices do you think helped/failed to achieve this?
o If you had the option to do it differently, what would you change?
In your opinion, what was the single biggest factor in the success or failure of this
acquisition?
o Were there any other major factors that you would like to mention?
If you could do anything differently next time, what would you change?

Ending question:
• Is there anything I could or should have asked that I didn’t, or other details you’d
like to provide?
Footnote: The interview is intended to be flexible and open, but structured enough to
gather responses to the above. Other prompts may include:
• Can you tell me more about….?
•

Would you explain what you meant when you said…?

Prompts are used to further expand data collection and further understand explanations.
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Appendix D: Thank-You Email

Dear [Name],
Thank you for taking the time to speak with me about your successful experience with
integrating an acquisition. I appreciate the time spent and the discussion we had. If you’d
like to add anything or have any questions resulting from our discussion, please feel
welcome to contact me.
As a reminder, a summary of the results will be provided upon your request.
I appreciate your support of my thesis research.
Thank you,

Suzanne Dickinson
____________________________
Suzanne Dickinson
[contact information]

